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EXPENSIVE PATIENTS, REINSURANCE, AND THE FUTURE 
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 
Govind Persad* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2017, Americans spent over $3.4 trillion—nearly 18% of gross domestic 
product—on health care. This spending is unevenly distributed: Almost a 
quarter is spent on the costliest 1% of patients, and almost half on the costliest 
5%. Most of these patients soon return to a lower percentile, but many continue 
to incur health care costs in the top percentiles year after year. This Article 
focuses on the challenges that persistently expensive patients present for health 
law and policy, and how fairly dividing their medical costs among payers 
illuminates fundamental normative choices about the design and reform of 
health insurance. In doing so, this Article draws on bioethical and health policy 
analyses of the fair distribution of medical costs, and examines how legal 
doctrine shapes health systems’ options for responding to expensive patients. 
Part I of this Article discusses two real-world examples of expensive patients 
and the debate surrounding them, including the case of an Iowa teenager with 
hemophilia whose treatments cost more than $10 million per year. Part II then 
examines the normative question of how the costs of treating expensive patients’ 
medical conditions should be shared and identifies three different dimensions of 
sharing: (1) scope, from narrow (plan members only) to broad (all of society); 
(2) boundedness, whether there are limits on the costs others can be asked to 
bear; and (3) progressivity, whether wealthier individuals are asked to bear 
more costs (similar to progressivity in tax). Part III then considers how health 
care reform choices could advance or hamper the adoption of broad, bounded, 
progressive sharing, with a focus on recent state-level reinsurance programs 
that legal scholarship has not yet analyzed in depth. 
This Article contributes to the literature on health care reform in three 
interlocking ways. First, it develops a novel proposal for fairly sharing the cost 
of expensive patients’ care that could usefully inform state- and federal-level 
policy discussions. Second, it provides a normative, rather than purely political 
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or economic, analysis of existing and proposed options for sharing expensive 
patients’ costs. Third, it bridges the disconnected literature on reinsurance, limit 
setting, and health care financing, identifying how proposals in these different 
areas intersect.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Americans spent more than $3.6 trillion on health care—nearly 18% 
of gross domestic product (GDP).1 This statistic conceals an underlying 
inequality: The top 5% most expensive patients incur more than half of health 
care costs, and the top 1% incur almost a quarter.2 Most of these expensive 
patients do not remain expensive year after year.3 Many have suffered one-off 
events—appendicitis, pregnancy, car accidents—and will soon return to a lower 
level of spending. But some incur high medical costs year after year. These 
patients—who might be called chronic rather than acute expensive patients—
are the focus of this Article.  
This Article’s goal is not to scapegoat these patients as the cause of health 
system failures, but to consider how fairly sharing the cost of their care 
illuminates fundamental normative choices about the design and reform of 
health insurance. In doing so, this Article draws on work in bioethics and health 
policy on the fair distribution of medical costs and examines how legal doctrine 
channels the ways that health systems can respond to expensive patients. 
Part I begins by discussing two real-world examples of expensive patients 
and the debate surrounding them, including the case of an Iowa teenager with 
hemophilia whose treatments cost more than $10 million per year.4 Part II then 
considers the normative question of how the costs of treating expensive patients’ 
medical conditions should be shared. This Article focuses on three axes along 
which conceptions of sharing might differ: 
1. The scope, narrow to broad, of sharing. In narrow sharing, only 
certain social subgroups (e.g., employees of a firm, members of a 
plan, or residents of a U.S. state) share the cost of expensive 
patients’ treatment. The narrower the sharing, the smaller the 
 
 1 Rabah Kamal et al., How Has U.S. Spending on Healthcare Changed over Time?, PETERSON-KFF 
HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-spending-
healthcare-changed-time/#item-start. 
 2 Bradley Sawyer & Gary Claxton, How do Health Expenditures Vary Across the Population?, 
PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/ 
health-expenditures-vary-across-population/#item-start. 
 3 William C. Johnson et al., Consistently High Turnover in the Group of Top Health Care Spenders, 
NEJM CATALYST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20180202211922/https://catalyst.nejm.org/high-
turnover-top-health-care-spenders/. 
 4 See Tony Leys, Iowa Teen’s $1 Million-Per-Month Illness Is No Longer a Secret, DES MOINES REG. 
(May 31, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/health/2017/05/31/hemophilia-patient-
costing-iowa-insurer-1-million-per-month/356179001/ (describing treatments that cost $1 million per month). 
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subgroups. In contrast, under maximally broad sharing, everyone in 
society shares these costs. 
2. The boundedness of sharing. Unbounded sharing sets no limits on 
the health care costs that others are asked to assume. Bounded 
sharing, in contrast, specifies that certain health care costs are not 
shared at all, or are not shared by some individuals. 
3. The progressivity of sharing, similar to progressivity in tax. Some 
proposals for sharing expensive patients’ costs are regressive in that 
they charge equal absolute amounts to everyone; others are 
analogous to a flat tax, asking individuals to pay a fixed percentage 
of their income. Still, others are progressive, taxing a higher 
percentage of wealthier contributors’ economic holdings.  
I argue that broad, bounded, progressive sharing—the opposite of the sharing 
that most private insurance facilitates—is the most normatively compelling. 
Part III then considers how health care reform could further or stymie the 
adoption of broad, bounded, progressive sharing. It explores breadth by 
considering programs that socialize the costs of treating specific groups of 
expensive patients, such as Medicare’s inclusion of patients with end-stage renal 
disease, and it also discusses the role of government-subsidized reinsurance in 
increasing the breadth of sharing. This Part then turns to boundedness, 
discussing how public and private insurers’ use of health technology assessment 
could set cost-based limits on sharing and considering how such limits intersect 
with disability and antidiscrimination law. Lastly, it considers progressivity, 
contrasting financing through taxation with financing through insurance 
premiums. This Article concludes that broad, bounded, progressive sharing is 
the best way of distributing the costs of expensive patients’ treatment. This 
strategy would achieve breadth and progressivity by funding treatments above a 
given cost through a tax that only falls on individuals whose income exceeds 
that cost, and would set boundaries by discouraging the development of 
interventions that would make patients expensive.  
This Article contributes to the literature on health care reform in three 
interlocking ways. First, it develops a novel proposal for fairly sharing the cost 
of expensive patients that could usefully inform policy discussions at the state 
and national levels. Second, it provides a normative, rather than purely political 
or economic, analysis both of its proposal and of existing options for 
apportioning expensive patients’ costs. Few commentators have analyzed the 
normative challenges that expensive patients present for health insurance design. 
Third, it bridges the disconnected literature on reinsurance, limit-setting, and 
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health care financing, identifying how proposals in these different areas 
intersect. Its discussion of reinsurance is particularly timely given the flurry of 
recent reinsurance proposals at the state level.5 
I. EXPENSIVE PATIENTS: TWO VIGNETTES 
That most health spending involves a small fraction of patients has prompted 
innovative health policy responses. Most of these responses focus on patients 
(often called “super-utilizers”) who are expensive because of repeated 
emergency room visits and poor coordination of care.6 While improving care for 
these patients is an important arena for health system innovation, it involves no 
fundamental ethical trade-offs. Successful innovation is likely to be both cost-
saving for health systems and health-improving for patients. This Article, in 
contrast, focuses on patients whose persistently high costs cannot be addressed 
through improved coordination of care or other logistical fixes.  
The first example this Article discusses is an Iowa teenager with 
hemophilia.7 In 2016 and 2017, Iowa’s largest Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
insurer, Wellmark, announced substantial premium increases and justified them 
by the need to offset the costs incurred by a single patient who required 
treatments costing $1 million per month.8 The company’s announcement led to 
a suit alleging that Wellmark violated this patient’s privacy and unfairly 
discriminated against patients with hemophilia.9 Wellmark left Iowa’s ACA 
 
 5 See infra Part III.A. Legal scholarship has not yet analyzed these state reinsurance proposals: The last 
comprehensive analysis of health care reinsurance was Mark A. Hall, Government-Sponsored Reinsurance, 19 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 467 (2010). Though Hall’s article is excellent, it does not examine the recent state 
proposals discussed in Part III.A. 
 6 E.g., Atul Gawande, The Hot Spotters, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2011/01/24/the-hot-spotters; Kushal T. Kadakia et al., Hot-Spotting North Carolina’s Medicaid 
Transformation, HEALTH AFF.: CONSIDERING HEALTH SPENDING (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
do/10.1377/hblog20191029.338902/full/. 
 7 Hemophilia is a congenital bleeding disorder that leads to painful and dangerous bleeding episodes. 
See Sheh-Li Chen, Economic Costs of Hemophilia and the Impact of Prophylactic Treatment on Patient 
Management, 22 AM. J. MANAGED CARE S126, S129 (2016). Clotting factor concentrates are used to treat 
hemophilia. Id. Hemophilia is costly to treat, particularly in patients who have developed antibodies to clotting 
factor, for whom mean annual costs approach $700,000. Id.  
 8 See Leys, supra note 4; see also MARK HALL, STABILIZING AND STRENGTHENING THE INDIVIDUAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: A VIEW FROM TEN STATES 37 (2018) (discussing “the publicly-discussed 
presence of a single individual with a chronic genetic condition (hemophilia) that was costing Blue Cross several 
million dollars a year, which contributed to its decision to leave the market after just one year,” and noting that 
“[o]bservers also thought that this single patient made other insurers reluctant to enter or remain in the market, 
knowing that this individual would likely transfer enrollment to one of them”). 
 9 See Administrative Complaint, Nat’l Hemophilia Found. v. Wellmark Inc. (Aug. 14, 2017), https:// 
strategichealthcare.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/wellmark-complaint.pdf. 
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marketplace in 2018; when another insurer, Medica, entered, it set premiums 
even higher.10 
In a HuffPost article, Jonathan Cohn argues that, contrary to Wellmark’s 
assertions, the costly hemophilia treatments were not the cause of increased 
premiums: 
“I cried for two weeks,” said Lisa, who agreed to talk to HuffPost on 
the condition that we not reveal the family’s real names or identifying 
details. “Not only is he reading that he’s the reason that people can’t 
be insured, he’s been reading people had to pay more money for 
insurance premiums just to take care of him. He’s scared, and it’s very 
upsetting.” Eventually she and her husband―we’ll call him 
Michael―sat down with Jacob, hoping to convey a simple message: 
“We just want[ed] to make sure he knows it’s not his fault.” It turns 
out they were right about that―in more ways than they probably 
realized.11 
Cohn argues that Iowa’s high premiums stem from mistakes and challenges in 
governance rather than from Jacob’s medical costs.12 The sparsely populated 
geography of rural Iowa means that many providers have effective 
monopolies.13 The state’s Republican governor failed to support exchange 
enrollment, and the Trump Administration cut risk-sharing payments to insurers 
who had expensive patients.14 Many Iowans with individual health plans were 
grandfathered into noncompliant plans outside of the new ACA exchanges.15 All 
of this led to a smaller and sicker pool of exchange enrollees.16 Another 
commentator observes that the cost per participant for Jacob’s treatment would 
have been much lower if Iowa had been able to spread costs across a larger pool 
of enrollees.17 In any event, Cohn argues that premium increases to pay for 
Jacob’s care would be justified: “The whole point of health insurance is to pay 
 
 10 Jonathan Cohn, An Iowa Teenager Didn’t Wreck His State’s Health Care Market. Here’s Who Did., 
HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iowa-teenager-obamacare-scapegoat_n_59f4715de4b077d8dfc9dd 
70 (last updated Oct. 29, 2017). “Jacob” and “Lisa” are pseudonyms. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See id.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Erik Westlund, The Story of the $1-Million-Per-Month Iowa Teen with Hemophilia Outed by a Health 
Insurance Executive: Reflections from a Hemophilia Parent, MEDIUM (June 1, 2017), https://medium.com/ 
@erikdbwestlund/the-story-of-the-1-million-per-month-iowa-teen-with-hemophilia-outed-by-a-health-
insurance-cb47d6bd66a5. 
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for the medical expenses of the small number of people with the most serious 
health problems.”18  
Two core themes of Cohn’s article, which repeat themselves in the next 
narrative that this Article discusses, are: (1) rejection of the claim that expensive 
patients are a cause of high costs by arguing that other actors are either the 
underlying or the intervening cause of these costs (i.e., the no-causation claim); 
and (2) rejection of the claim that limits should be placed on what society will 
pay to meet expensive patients’ costs by arguing that the main purpose of health 
insurance is to meet these costs (i.e., the no-limits claim).  
In 2012, Deanna Fei’s daughter, Mila, was—like Jacob—singled out as an 
expensive patient.19 Although Mila’s medical costs will likely be only a fraction 
of Jacob’s, her story has many parallels to his. Mila was born at twenty-five 
weeks; despite only one-in-three odds of avoiding death or serious disability, 
she survived months of intensive treatments to become a healthy toddler.20 The 
next year, AOL CEO Tim Armstrong justified employee benefit cuts on the basis 
that “distressed babies that were born that we paid a million dollars each” had 
depleted the company’s finances.21 One of the babies Armstrong referenced was 
Mila.22  
In an article in Slate, and later in a book, Girl in Glass, Fei offers an 
impressively nuanced reply to concerns about the cost of Mila’s treatment.23 She 
recognizes that, “in a country where so many are forced to do without basic 
health care, it’s important to have a rational discussion about costs.”24 Fei 
acknowledges that whether a million dollars is a reasonable amount for society 
to pay to save a life is a matter of reasonable disagreement.25 Instead, she zeroes 
in on how the apparent cost of Mila’s care may inaccurately reflect its actual 
cost, given the difference between the sticker price of care and its discounted 
 
 18 Cohn, supra note 10. 
 19 DEANNA FEI, GIRL IN GLASS 235 (2015). 
 20 Id. at 4–6, 309–10. 
 21 Id. at 235. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Deanna Fei, My Baby and AOL’s Bottom Line, SLATE (Feb. 9, 2014, 10:27 AM), https://slate.com/ 
human-interest/2014/02/tim-armstrong-blames-distressed-babies-for-aol-benefit-cuts-hes-talking-about-my-
daughter.html; FEI, supra note 19, at 245. 
 24 FEI, supra note 19, at 252. 
 25 Id. at 273. Fei notes that an online commentator posted: “How much is too much? Is $1M to save a life 
worth it?” Id. at 270–71. 
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cost.26 And—as in Jacob’s case—she emphasizes the injustice and illegality of 
publicly identifying individuals who incur high health care costs.27  
Fei, like Cohn, endorses the no-limits and no-causation claims. She suggests 
that “the whole point of health insurance” is to pay for very costly care, and later 
that “the fundamental purpose of [health] insurance” is to cover everyone in the 
event of a catastrophe.28 In support of this understanding, Fei cites a health 
economist who reached out to her after Armstrong’s comments, describing him 
as saying: “High-cost claims are what insurance is designed to cover . . . . If it’s 
not for catastrophic claims, then what’s it for? Nobody has a million dollars to 
pay for an event that everyone would want to have covered.”29 Similarly, Fei 
argues that Mila imposed no costs on AOL or other employees, instead blaming 
corporate greed and the flawed structure of employer-based insurance: “[I]f 
anyone is responsible for doing something ‘high-risk’ that cost AOL two million 
dollars, it’s not the women who conceived the babies. It’s the CEO and 
management team in charge of the company.”30 She contends that AOL could 
have easily protected itself from high costs via reinsurance coverage,31 and that 
rather than cutting retirement benefits, Armstrong could have reduced his $12 
million paycheck to cover the cost of Mila’s care.32 Even better, she suggests, 
would be separating health insurance from employment, thereby eliminating 
employers’ and fellow employees’ resentment of high-cost patients and 
removing incentives to fire employees with high health care costs.33 These 
themes will resurface in Part III’s discussion of breadth and progressivity in 
health insurance. 
Jacob’s and Mila’s stories represent snapshots of a larger phenomenon. The 
number of patients with yearly claims over $1 million rose by 87% from 2014 
to 2017.34 A recent report noted two patients whose yearly treatment costs were 
$5 million or more (for hereditary angioedema and for hemophilia), and 
observed that the average yearly treatment cost in the database for hemophilia 
 
 26 Id. at 274–75. 
 27 Id. at 252, 266. 
 28 Id. at 245, 277. 
 29 Id. at 277. 
 30 Id. at 272. 
 31 Id. at 276. Part III.A, infra, takes up the question of reinsurance. 
 32 FEI, supra note 19, at 278–79. 
 33 See id. at 282–83. 
 34 Press Release, Sun Life Fin., Million-Dollar+ Medical Claims Increase 87 Percent from 2014–2017: 
Sun Life Report (July 16, 2018), https://www.sunlife.com/us/News+and+insights/Press+releases/2018/Million-
dollar+medical+claims+increase+87+percent+from+2014-2017+Sun+Life+report?vgnLocale=en_CA. 
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was over $400,000.35 A 2009 article observed that the rate of payouts over $1 
million increased from less than one per million individuals in 2000 to a 
projected twenty-four to thirty-six per million in 2010.36 This phenomenon has 
been a driver of reform proposals. One commenter on Alaska’s insurance market 
stated: “You just need a couple of people with $1 million in claims, which these 
days is not unusual, . . . but say it’s a $40 million market, . . . a couple of people 
with $2 million of claims just basically raises rates double-digits for the whole 
buying population.”37 
II. FAIR SHARING 
Prior to the ACA, insurers could avoid paying some high-cost claims by 
refusing coverage to patients with preexisting conditions, or by capping annual 
or lifetime payouts.38 While these strategies saddled families with medical costs 
that were frequently impossible to pay, they provided a ceiling on insurers’ 
exposure.39 The demise of these limiting strategies presents a normative 
question: Should others in society help meet these costs, and, if so, how should 
the costs be divided? 
Both Cohn’s discussion of Iowa’s marketplace and Fei’s criticism of AOL’s 
insurance decisions suggest that treatment costs can be addressed through 
fundamentally technical fixes that require no difficult, normative trade-offs.40 In 
contrast, this Part argues that fairly dividing the cost of treating expensive 
patients requires addressing three complex normative issues. The first involves 
breadth: whether expensive patients’ medical costs should be shared primarily 
among individuals who are more closely connected to the expensive patient 
(such as those in the same insurance plan), or instead shared across society. The 
second is boundedness: whether there are limits on the costs others can be asked 
to pay for expensive patients’ treatment, and how such limits could be justified. 
The last is progressivity: whether better-off individuals should assume a greater 
share of expensive patients’ costs. Although breadth, boundedness, and 
progressivity are distinct concepts, they are also interconnected. Broader 
sharing, for instance, enables greater progressivity, because it allows costs to be 
 
 35 SUN LIFE FIN., 2018 SUN LIFE STOP-LOSS RESEARCH REPORT 5, 19 (2018).  
 36 Maureen Glabman, Million-Dollar Claim Club, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Mar. 1, 2009), https://www. 
managedcaremag.com/archives/2009/3/million-dollar-claim-club. 
 37 HALL, supra note 8, at 35. 
 38 See Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit 
Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241, 283, 294 (2010) 
(explaining several ACA reforms). 
 39 Thanks to Mark Hall for this point. 
 40 See Cohn, supra note 10; FEI, supra note 19, at 276. 
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shared among a pool that, because it is larger, is likely to include more wealthy 
households. And it allows the cost of expensive patients’ care to be funded via 
taxation, which can be progressive, rather than by increasing premiums or out-
of-pocket costs for other plan members, which is more difficult to make 
progressive. 
Part II.A considers breadth and argues that broad sharing of costs is 
normatively preferable to narrow sharing. Part II.B argues that sharing should 
be bounded and identifies different bases for limits, including cost-effectiveness, 
past treatment use, and choice. Part II.C argues that there is a compelling case 
for progressive sharing, stronger than the general case for progressivity in 
taxation. 
A. Breadth 
In contrast to the United Kingdom’s National Health Service and similar 
systems that fund all health care costs from tax revenues and therefore share 
those costs broadly across the population, the United States’ health care system 
is characterized by narrow rather than broad sharing.41 The narrowness of 
American sharing is reflected in the fact that Medicaid and ACA marketplace 
insurance pools only include residents of a single state (and the ACA pools are 
separated by insurer), and that more than half of the insured population is 
covered by employer-based insurance.42 
Mila’s and Jacob’s expenses were shared relatively narrowly. As is typical 
in self-funded employer-based insurance, Mila’s medical costs were initially 
shouldered by AOL, which passed them on to employees.43 Jacob’s expenses, 
similarly, were initially assumed by Wellmark (and later by Medica), who 
 
 41 See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 184–85 (2016) (contrasting “countries like the UK, where nearly the entire market 
is defined by reference to their national insurance structure” with “the U.S., where our system is fragmented and 
defined by a number of separate insurance structures”). See generally Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: 
Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2010) (discussing 
the factors that have produced a proliferation of separate insurance plans in the United States). 
 42 See Hoffman, supra note 41, at 54 (observing that “each state has developed its own health insurance 
rules and market” and that “risk doesn’t effectively pool across state lines for the most part,” and also that more 
lenient regulation for self-funded insurance plans has “motivated many large employers to self-fund their health 
insurance plans and, in so doing, extract their employees into their own risk pool”); Health Insurance Coverage 
of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/ 
?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#note
-1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) (analyzing population in 2018). 
 43 FEI, supra note 19, at 243–44. 
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passed them on to other insureds in the Iowa exchange.44 Commentators on both 
cases identify narrow sharing as objectionable.45 It is worth examining the 
normative problems with narrow sharing in detail. 
One objection to narrow sharing is that it arbitrarily burdens those asked to 
share the cost of expensive patients’ treatment. Alison Hoffman has argued that 
one major goal of health insurance is counteracting the effects of bad luck.46 But 
even though narrow sharing cushions expensive patients from the financial 
consequences of their bad luck, it imposes arbitrary bad luck on those unlucky 
enough to end up as members of the same insurance plan, while allowing 
individuals outside that plan to enjoy arbitrary good luck. Broad sharing would 
eliminate this luck-based difference. Deborah Stone has similarly argued that 
health insurance should be organized around a principle of solidarity, in which 
individuals share one another’s health care costs.47 Although narrow sharing 
requires those in the same insurance pool to stand in solidarity with expensive 
patients, it requires no solidarity from individuals in other insurance pools. 
Broader sharing produces more consistent solidarity. 
The burdens of narrow sharing can be severe as well as arbitrary. The $33 
per month—nearly $400 per year—that it would cost to share Jacob’s $12 
million of yearly expenses evenly across a pool of thirty thousand insured 
households is a serious burden,48 given that a $400 expense would be 
unaffordable for four in ten American households.49 Narrow sharing, even while 
it helps keep expensive patients afloat, could drag many other families under, 
jeopardizing the financial security that Hoffman and others identify as a core 
goal of insurance.50 As such, narrow sharing could be contrary to the goal of 
“reducing Americans’ financial exposure to medical care costs,”51 because it 
excessively exposes many American households to others’ health care costs. 
 
 44 Cohn, supra note 10. 
 45 FEI, supra note 19, at 35; Cohn, supra note 10. 
 46 Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1922–32 (2011) (discussing the “brute luck” 
justification for health insurance). 
 47 Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 
290–91 (1993). 
 48 See Westlund, supra note 17 (calculating the cost of sharing Jacob’s expenses among a million 
households). 
 49 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. 
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017 1, 2 (2018). 
 50 Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1908–22 (discussing a variety of policies that aim to “prevent the costs of 
medical care from causing financial insecurity” and reviewing the work of other scholars who conceptualize 
health insurance as reducing insecurity). 
 51 Id. at 1921. 
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In contrast, broad sharing could mean that the cost of sharing expensive 
patients’ treatment does not jeopardize financial security. The prevalence of 
expensive patients, however, means that broad sharing alone will not ensure 
financial security. For instance, while a hemophilia advocate observes that 
sharing the cost of Jacob’s treatment across a million insured households would 
cost each only a dollar per month,52 a pool of a million households is likely to 
include more than one very expensive patient. This suggests that fairly sharing 
the cost of expensive patients’ treatment will require progressive and/or 
bounded, rather than simply broad, sharing. Broad sharing is nevertheless 
important to progressivity, because the small groups characteristic of narrow 
sharing are more likely to lack a sufficient number of wealthy members who 
could collectively bear the cost of paying for expensive patients’ treatment 
without jeopardizing their own financial security. 
Even if broad sharing is fairer than narrow sharing, is narrow sharing fairer 
than no sharing? It is unfair to place a crushing burden on the shoulders of 
expensive patients, but it is also unfair to transfer much of that burden to an 
arbitrarily selected group who are ill placed to assume it. Imagine the resentment 
and perceptions of unfairness that would follow the adoption of a no-fault 
insurance rule that required a person’s neighbors, and only her neighbors, to 
share the cost of her accidental injuries. 
Because broad sharing is normatively preferable to narrow sharing, 
expensive patients bear some responsibility for the costs that treating them 
imposes on others, via narrow sharing, in situations where broad sharing is 
unavailable due to logistical or political impediments. That expensive patients 
bear responsibility does not imply that they bear sole, or even primary, 
responsibility, or that they act wrongly, all things considered, in benefiting from 
narrow sharing. Commentators are right to note that other actors who prevent 
broad sharing or raise the cost of treatment—firms, CEOs, state lawmakers, 
pharmaceutical firms—also bear responsibility for the burdens narrow sharing 
imposes,53 and that these actors are more morally culpable than expensive 
patients are. Yet, if expensive patients know that the cost of their treatment will 
end up unfairly burdening others because of unjust social arrangements, they too 
are responsible for this outcome. Such expensive patients are analogous to 
consumers who need to use electricity even though electricity generation 
 
 52 Westlund, supra note 17. 
 53 See Cohn, supra note 10; Fei, supra note 23; Westlund, supra note 17 (contending that “[t]he market 
for expensive drugs is distorted by copay assistance programs” funded by manufacturers). 
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produces unjust environmental and climate harms.54 While producers, not 
consumers, bear primary responsibility for environmental harm, the consumers 
who continue to purchase electricity also bear responsibility given that they 
know the real-world consequence of their choices.55 The no-causation position 
discussed in Part I is therefore mistaken: Jacob—given existing unjust 
arrangements—genuinely is a cause of others’ increased premiums, and his 
family should acknowledge rather than avoid that fact.56 Expensive patients 
plausibly have a duty to advocate—as Fei and others have—for a shift toward 
broad sharing.57 
It is worth considering whether narrow sharing between employees could be 
defended via a “common undertaking” argument that parallels the legal doctrine 
of liability for failure to rescue. Tort law recognizes that individuals pursuing a 
common undertaking have enforceable obligations to rescue one another.58 
However, employees are typically not understood as pursuing a common 
undertaking in this sense: Although employers have a duty to rescue employees 
in danger,59 employees do not have a legally enforceable duty to one another,60 
and in any event Mila herself was not an AOL employee, but rather an 
employee’s child. A common-undertaking argument likewise would not support 
narrow sharing in Jacob’s case, because those asked to share his costs are not 
fellow employees but rather fellow participants in an ACA exchange.  
B. Boundedness 
The U.S. health care system is also characterized by unbounded sharing: 
There are few limits on the quantity or cost of approved treatments that insured 
patients can receive from a plan.61 Setting limits on access to treatments is 
 
 54 Cf. Nathan Ostrander, Consumer Liability for Harms Linked to Purchases, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 111, 123 (2011). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Cf. Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 20 n.10 (1971) 
(discussing situations where multiple individuals are causes of an outcome). Contra Cohn, supra note 10 
(describing Jacob’s parents’ effort to assuage his concern that “people had to pay more money for insurance 
premiums just to take care of him”). 
 57 Cf. Stephanie Collins, Filling Collective Duty Gaps, 114 J. PHIL. 573, 577 (2017). 
 58 See Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976). 
 59 See e.g., Hanseatische Reederei Emil Offen & Co. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 590 F.2d 778, 783 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (discussing arguments regarding employer’s “duty to rescue injured employees”); State v. Hunter, 
911 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (“Special types of relationships, however, have been found to create 
a duty to render aid, such as . . . employer/employee . . . .” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A 
(1964))).  
 60 See Hunter, 911 P.2d at 1124 (“Generally, there is no legal duty to rescue or render aid to another in 
peril.” (citing People v. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 147 (1989))). 
 61 See William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals 
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among the most difficult normative problems in health system design, and is an 
even more difficult political problem.62 For instance, despite popular concern 
about “death panels” that would limit access to treatment, the Affordable Care 
Act imposed no limits on access.63 Rather, it did away with annual and lifetime 
dollar limits on health care.64 While these limits placed serious burdens on 
expensive patients,65 their removal exposes others to unlimited costs.  
Many have argued that limit setting is unnecessary because expensive 
patients impose only de minimis burdens on others. Deborah Peel, for instance, 
argues in her discussion of Mila’s case that while Americans “blame the sick 
people for being expensive, . . . the same sick people everywhere else—in the 
UK—. . . wouldn’t be causing excess costs to the system.”66 Similarly, Cohn 
asserts, in reply to Jacob’s father’s plea that someone tell him “that [my son] 
will get his medicine,” that: 
That’s not a lot to ask―or, at least, it shouldn’t be. The whole point of 
health insurance is to pay for the medical expenses of the small number 
of people with the most serious health problems. The way to do that is 
to have a large group of people that looks something like the 
population as a whole, with mostly healthy people, paying into a 
common system. Every other developed country in the world 
accomplishes this with some form of national health insurance.67 
As Part II.A argued, while sharing the costs of expensive patients across a 
broader set of patients is necessary for fairness, it is not sufficient. Limit setting 
remains necessary even in a regime of broad sharing. What Peel and Cohn do 
not mention is that most countries with broad sharing set stricter limits on access 
than the United States does.68 The UK’s National Institute for Clinical 
 
of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 640 (2003) (“Although the public thinks of 
managed care as cost-obsessed, virtually no health insurance policies explicitly refer to cost or cost-effectiveness 
in setting coverage standards or defining medical necessity.”). 
 62 See Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act, 41 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 119, 123 (2015); see also Peter D. Jacobson & Johanna R. Lauer, Health Reform 2010: Incremental 
Advance or Radical Transformation?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1284–86 (2010) (reviewing political obstacles to 
limit-setting). 
 63 See Persad, supra note 62, at 126. 
 64 Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1918 (discussing the ACA’s elimination of lifetime limits). 
 65 Id. at 1919 (“These types of limits had previously created the potential for significant financial 
insecurity among a small, very sick population.”). 
 66 Jana Kasperkevic, ‘We Blame the Sick for Being Expensive’: The Mother Whose Baby Cost AOL $1m, 
GUARDIAN (July 4, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/04/deanna-fei-aol-distressed-
baby-healthcare-privacy. 
 67 Cohn, supra note 10. 
 68 See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Saindon, Book Review, 18 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 237, 240 (1994) (reviewing 
LAURENE A. GRAIG, HEALTH OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1993)) (“[T]he United States has failed to set any limits on 
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Excellence (NICE), for instance, limits access to treatments that exceed 
specified cost-effectiveness thresholds.69 Many other countries regulate 
pharmaceutical pricing tightly and do not offer certain expensive treatments.70 
Boundedness need not involve setting hard limits on lifetime medical costs 
or receipt of treatment, as pre-ACA lifetime limits did. A better way of using 
lifetime limits is as a transition device between different payers, rather than as a 
hard stop on access to medical care. For instance, an expensive patient might not 
reasonably be able to ask other plan participants to absorb more than a limited 
amount of medical costs via premium increases, but costs beyond this limit 
would still be covered, albeit from a different source such as general public 
funds.71  
Three plausible bases for establishing boundaries are value, use, and choice. 
Boundaries based on value consider the benefit that a given treatment provides 
in comparison to its cost and set limits on treatments that are not cost-effective. 
Boundaries based on use consider how much others have already contributed to 
a given expensive patient’s costs and set limits on how much any individual can 
receive. Boundaries based on choice consider whether a patient’s medical costs 
stem from choices about which people could reasonably disagree and set limits 
on how much others can be asked to bear the cost of these choices. 
Pre-ACA lifetime limits served insurers’ financial interests; they were not 
grounded in a principled normative rationale. In contrast, a compelling 
normative justification for limit-setting can be found in Ronald Dworkin’s work 
on health insurance.72 Dworkin proposes designing an insurance plan by 
 
health care expenditures. Other nations have been far more successful in keeping overall health care costs, as a 
percentage of gross domestic product, far lower than the U.S., mainly due to the stringent cost control measures 
that form central roles in their health care legislation.”). 
 69 See Persad, supra note 62, at 130; Christopher T. Robertson, The Presumption Against Expensive 
Health Care Consumption, 49 TULSA L. REV. 627, 629 n.15 (2014). 
 70 E.g., Yuting Zhang et al., Comparing the Approval and Coverage Decisions of New Oncology Drugs 
in the United States and Other Selected Countries, 23 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 247, 252 
(2017) (comparing approval and coverage decisions in the UK, France, Australia, and Canada). 
 71 An example of a payment transition device is the eligibility of infants whose hospital stay exceeds 
thirty days for Medicaid (a federal program funded by tax revenues) regardless of their parents’ income. See, 
e.g., OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH, FAMILY HANDBOOK FOR FAMILIES OF CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL HEALTH CARE 
NEEDS IN OHIO 12 (2018). Because Medicaid serves as a secondary insurer, this policy does not shift costs borne 
by other insured individuals to the public, but does shift some costs from the parents to the public. Thanks to 
Timothy Jost for this example. 
 72 See Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton’s Plan Be Fair?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 13, 1994), https://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/1994/01/13/will-clintons-plan-be-fair/ [hereinafter Dworkin, Clinton’s Plan]; see also 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, 38 MCGILL L.J. 883, 890–92 (1993) [hereinafter 
Dworkin, Distribution of Health Care]. 
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considering what society would spend on health care if the distribution of 
economic resources were fair and knowledge about the cost and benefit of 
medical procedures were open to all, but individuals and insurance companies 
were unaware of any particular person’s specific risk of disease.73 He argues that 
under these conditions, individuals would choose bounded rather than 
unbounded sharing.74 In particular, they would accept limits on costly treatments 
for patients who are permanently unconscious or have advanced dementia, and 
on treatments that have poor chances of success or can only extend life briefly.75 
And he argues that individuals would select insurance plans that require a 
reasonable chance of success before providing life-saving treatment for 
seriously ill infants.76  
Critics have challenged Dworkin by arguing that the hard choices he 
discusses will typically be resolved in favor of unbounded sharing in practice: 
What [Dworkin] does not speak to, however, is the case of heroic (and 
costly) treatments of probable value. It is precisely in this area that the 
decisions of the “prudent individual” might very well be in conflict 
with those of the society as a whole. Long-term renal dialysis for 
otherwise healthy patients is a classic example of a procedure that 
might be termed heroic but effective, as is bone marrow 
transplantation for certain forms of leukemia. Whereas a utilitarian 
perspective might argue that it is not prudent to provide insurance for 
such care, as it can consume considerable resources that might 
otherwise be used to benefit larger groups of individuals, it is likely 
that most individuals would want such treatments available to them. It 
seems to me that in instances in which medical intervention can 
prevent an early death and restore more or less normal functioning, 
most people probably do make decisions on the basis of a rescue 
principle, i.e., a willingness to bear any cost to save life and/or health.77 
Dworkin’s response is concessive: He admits that people would likely pay for 
treatments like dialysis or bone marrow transplantation, but that their 
willingness to pay reflects a willingness to accept high but bounded costs rather 
than an endorsement of the (unbounded) rescue principle.78 He also observes 
 
 73 Dworkin, Clinton’s Plan, supra note 72. 
 74 See id. (arguing that a rational person would not choose “to buy insurance providing every form of 
treatment or care that might conceivably be beneficial for him under any circumstance”). 
 75 See Dworkin, Distribution of Health Care, supra note 72, at 892. 
 76 Dworkin, Clinton’s Plan, supra note 72. 
 77 Bruce L. Smith & Jack G. Kleinman, Would Clinton’s Plan Be Fair?: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(May 26, 1994), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1994/05/26/would-clintons-plan-be-fair-an-exchange/. 
 78 See Ronald Dworkin, Response, Would Clinton’s Plan Be Fair?: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(May 26, 1994), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1994/05/26/would-clintons-plan-be-fair-an-exchange/ 
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that willingness to pay may be contextual—that “added life has an importance 
to people, one by one, that it does not have in familiar versions of aggregate cost-
benefit calculations.”79 
Dworkin’s comments point us toward two more compelling responses that 
Dworkin himself did not offer. The first is to consider how his proposal for 
insurance, which stipulates that people’s economic shares are highly equal, 
would translate back into real-world circumstances of economic inequality. 
Dworkin argues that poorer people should not be required to pay higher 
premiums for a generous insurance package when they might reasonably prefer 
to spend their money on important goods other than health care.80 Conversely, 
although Dworkin does not explore this, it might be appropriate to require 
wealthier people to pay high premiums for very generous insurance packages. 
Even if the opportunity costs of guaranteeing access to treatments that cost $12 
million per year would make doing so imprudent for poor and middle-class 
patients, it might be prudent for a very wealthy person to accept these costs. And 
since it is only a matter of luck that Jacob, rather than a very wealthy person, is 
an expensive patient, it might be reasonable to ask a wealthy person to share the 
cost of Jacob’s treatment even if it is not reasonable to ask a poor or middle-
class person to do so. Rather than weakening boundedness in rescue cases, as 
Dworkin does, we can instead make the more modest concession that weaker 
boundedness is justified only in the presence of greater progressivity. 
The second response reflects the fact that objections to limits on life-saving 
treatment may involve preferences that are different in (as Dworkin puts it) the 
“one by one”81 context than at the societal level. Boundedness will be easier to 
achieve if limit-setting decisions are made at a societal level, in a way that 
eliminates the possibility of facing one-by-one decisions about individual access 
to lifesaving interventions. Confining limit setting to the societal level resembles 
a strategy for surmounting challenges that involve time-inconsistent or 
situationally inconsistent preferences—for instance, someone who avows 
moderation when she is at a safe distance from the cookie jar but knows that if 
she is in proximity to the cookies she will eat them all.82 Precommitment can be 
an effective approach to inconsistent preferences about limit setting, just as it is 
to as with time and situational inconsistency. Ensuring that there are no cookies 
 
[hereinafter Dworkin, Response]. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Dworkin, Clinton’s Plan, supra note 72. 
 81 Dworkin, Response, supra note 78. 
 82 Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1378–79 (2011) (discussing an example of 
preference reversal). 
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in the house eliminates the risk of eating all the cookies, as well as the 
psychological cost of denying oneself cookies when they are nearby.83 Similarly, 
ensuring that interventions that would make patients expensive are not 
developed or marketed can eliminate the psychological and ethical cost of failing 
to rescue someone with easily available means: By precommitting to make 
certain rescues impossible, society can avoid the burden of refusing to provide 
achievable but expensive rescues. 
Precommitment might be less necessary where many treatments could keep 
a patient alive or maintain quality of life. For instance, providing access only to 
a lower-cost but reasonably effective treatment rather than to the most expensive 
drug available might be both politically feasible and ethically non-wrenching. 
Some European countries adopt this approach by using a more generous 
coverage threshold when a treatment is the only one available for a given 
condition, but a less generous one for new treatments for an already treatable 
condition.84 
Dworkin’s analysis also suggests that it can be legitimate to set limits based 
on choice: 
In my own view, fairness would not require universal coverage unless 
a substantial majority of prudent people would insure to provide it. If 
only a bare majority would do so, it would seem unfair to provide it 
for everyone, making almost half the population buy insurance that 
they did not want. (Though in such cases the additional coverage 
should of course be available as supplementary insurance at an 
additional premium.)85  
Dworkin gives the case of “costly neo-natal treatment for extremely premature 
babies”—like Mila—as an example where “people would have sharply different 
opinions” about coverage.86  
Dworkin’s speculation that covering very premature neonates would be 
socially contested is borne out by recent debates over whether we should 
understand treating extremely premature babies as “saving” them or continuing 
their gestation.87 It is also borne out by the debate Fei acknowledges regarding 
 
 83 See id. at 1417 (discussing various precommitment strategies, including “self-exclusion policies 
offered by casinos” and “agreements to forfeit money if [people] break their promises to themselves”); id. at 
1389–90 (discussing the cost of exercising willpower). 
 84 See Katherine Eve Young et al., A Comparative Study of Orphan Drug Prices in Europe, 5 J. MKT. 
ACCESS & HEALTH POL’Y 1, 4 (2017). 
 85 See Dworkin, Response, supra note 78. 
 86 Id.  
 87 See, e.g., Jeremy R. Garrett et al., What We Do When We Resuscitate Extremely Preterm Infants, AM. 
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Mila’s treatment,88 and by similar discussions elsewhere regarding the wisdom 
of treating very premature infants.89 Progressivity also presents a solution to 
Dworkin’s concern that making “almost half the population buy insurance that 
they did not want” is unfair.90 While prudent members of a highly equal society 
might elect not to assume the cost of treating very expensive neonates, they 
would more likely choose access to such treatment if they were very rich. 
Requiring wealthy CEOs to fund treatment for very premature infants is 
normatively defensible in a way that requiring working-class households to do 
so might not be.91 
Choice-based limits could also be achieved by discouraging the 
development or marketing of costly, socially contested treatments. Such an 
approach would avoid the ethical and psychic challenges that saying no to 
patients in one-on-one situations presents but would eliminate the possibility of 
allowing individuals who value those treatments to opt into access in advance. 
C. Progressivity 
Using insurance to divide the burden of expensive patients’ care often 
produces arrangements that—if evaluated through a tax policy lens—would be 
described as regressive.92 Covering expensive patients’ costs by increasing the 
premiums of all insureds by the same amount, for instance, parallels a regressive 
user fee or head tax: It burdens the poor no less than the rich in absolute terms, 
and burdens the poor much more heavily as a percentage of income.93 Yet 
 
J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 2017, at 1, 2; Dean Hayden & Dominic Wilkinson, Asymmetrical Reasons, Newborn Infants, 
and Resource Allocation, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 2017, at 13, 14; Travis N. Rieder, Saving or Creating: Which 
Are We Doing When We Resuscitate Extremely Preterm Infants?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 2017, at 4, 10–11. 
 88 See FEI, supra note 19, at 27273. 
 89 E.g., Gautham K. Suresh, In the ‘Gray Zone,’ a Doctor Faces Tough Decisions on Infant Resuscitation, 
32 HEALTH AFF. 1841, 1844 (2013). 
 90 Dworkin, Response, supra note 78. 
 91 Cf. FEI, supra note 19, at 279 (arguing that “[t]here is no inherent reason why health care spending and 
retirement contributions must be pitted against each other,” and suggesting that “the real zero-sum game is 
between employee benefits and executive bonuses”). 
 92 Hoffman, supra note 41, at 33 (“[H]ealth redistribution can be regressive. Imagine a mandate requires 
every American to pay an equal amount for insurance, regardless of income. By doing so, it promotes horizontal 
equity (the notion that people with the same income should contribute equally) but simultaneously violates 
principles of vertical equity (the corollary that those with greater income should contribute more).”); see also 
Christopher T. Robertson, Scaling Cost-Sharing to Wages: How Employers Can Reduce Health Spending and 
Provide Greater Economic Security, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 244 (2014) (observing, 
regarding redistribution through insurance, that “[w]e would not tolerate this type of regressivity if the cost-
sharing burdens were conceived as taxes”).  
 93 Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2006, at 7, 28 (analogizing insurance premiums to “a ‘head tax,’ which falls on 
individuals without appreciable correlation to wealth, income, or ability to pay”). 
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“asking everyone to pay a little” to meet expensive patients’ costs is commonly 
endorsed, as in the suggestion that Jacob’s care could be funded through 
charging a dollar each to millions of insured households,94 and has been used to 
defend the funding of other expensive procedures through raised insurance 
premiums.95 Even scholars who emphasize concern for the poor endorse the 
imposition of small burdens on a large population via insurance without 
explicitly recognizing this approach’s regressivity.96 
Most defenses of funding expensive patients’ care through insurance tacitly 
assume that imposing small costs on a large group is fundamentally preferable 
to imposing large burdens on a small one. In ethics, this is termed the 
“aggregation problem.”97 The imposition of small burdens on many in order to 
greatly help a few is contested in ethical theory, and the view that doing so is 
acceptable may rest on cognitive limitations in visualizing the magnitude of the 
population who experiences the small burden.98 More seriously, in real-world 
cases, imposing putatively small costs on very large groups often will have the 
consequence of meaningfully harming a few within those groups. For instance, 
even if almost everyone could easily absorb an extra dollar per month in 
insurance premiums, a population of a million people is likely to contain some 
people for whom that dollar happens to be the difference between affording and 
not affording something important.99 
The claim that financing expensive patients’ treatment costs through 
insurance premiums redistributes from the healthy to the sick is similarly 
ubiquitous in health policy discussions.100 Yet expensive patients are not reliably 
 
 94 Westlund, supra note 17. 
 95 E.g., Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for 
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1840 (2007); see also Clio Sophia Koller, The Luxturna Debate: Why Ethics 
Needs a Seat at the Drug Pricing Table, BILL HEALTH (Jan. 2, 2019), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/ 
2019/01/02/the-luxturna-debate-why-ethics-needs-a-seat-at-the-drug-pricing-table/ (reporting suggestion by 
one expert, regarding Luxturna’s $850,000 price tag, that “sky-high pricing isn’t a problem with insurance 
spreading the cost”). 
 96 Stone, supra note 47, at 292 (“[S]ubsidy from the vast majority of policyholders to a small minority is 
precisely what is supposed to happen in insurance. Such skewing is what people agree to when they join a social 
insurance risk pool . . . . [T]hey believe that sickness is one of those contingencies when society should rally 
around the individual.”). 
 97 Norman Daniels, Four Unsolved Rationing Problems: A Challenge, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July–Aug. 
1994, at 27, 28. 
 98 See, e.g., Derek Parfit, Justifiability to Each Person, 16 RATIO 368, 375 (2003); John Broome, A 
Comment on Temkin’s Trade-Offs, in DANIEL WIKLER & C.J.L. MURRAY, FAIRNESS AND GOODNESS IN HEALTH 
5658 (forthcoming), http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0060/pdf/comment%20on%20temkins%20tradeoffs.pdf. 
 99 See, e.g., Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 34, at 242 (noting that any increase in premium rates 
may result in individuals not being able to afford insurance). 
 100 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 41, at 32 (arguing that the ACA’s design “compels the healthy to finance 
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sicker, understood in terms of shorter life expectancy, worse quality of life, or 
other plausible definitions,101 than those with less costly conditions.102 A patient 
with type 1 diabetes is not intrinsically healthier than Jacob—both require 
treatments to stay alive and maintain quality of life—but insulin is much cheaper 
than hemophilia prophylaxis.103 Rather than redistributing from the healthy to 
the sick, meeting the cost of expensive patients’ care by sharing it equally among 
all insureds redistributes from those who are less expensive (a group including 
both the healthy and the sick) to the expensive. Because many households are 
unable to comfortably absorb even small costs, making the broad group of sick 
but less expensive patients share the cost of expensive patients’ care may worsen 
health outcomes for many poor and middle-class insured patients. For instance, 
raising co-payments for cheaper medications in order to cover the cost of 
expensive treatments could lead to sick patients skipping doses of medication,104 
and raising premiums could lead to these patients simply going uninsured.105 
This underscores that insurance needs progressivity to serve its goal of ensuring 
 
care for those sicker than themselves”); Theodore W. Ruger, A New Deal in a World of Old Ones, 42 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1297, 1300 (2011) (arguing that the ACA redistributes resources “from the healthier to the sicker”); David 
A. Super, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and Popular Constitutionalism, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 873, 947 (2014) (describing the ACA as a “massive redistribution of wealth from the healthy to 
the sick”); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Book Review, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 117, 122 (2008) (reviewing SUSAN STARR 
SERED & RUSHIKA FERNADOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA (2007)) (“[R]edistribution from the healthy to the 
sick is a necessary part of health insurance.”). 
 101 Health policy research defines the “sick” in a variety of ways. See generally Paula Diehr et al., The 
Number of Sick Persons in a Cohort, 29 RES. ON AGING 555, 557 (2007) (describing eight ways of defining “sick 
persons”). 
 102 This contradicts the typical conflation of the most expensive patients with the sickest. E.g., John V. 
Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 533 (2005) 
(“Forty percent of health spending is attributable to the sickest 2 percent of the population, and 70 percent to the 
sickest 10 percent.”); Christopher Smith, It’s a Mistake: Insurer Cost Cutting, Insurer Liability, and the Lack of 
ERISA Preemption Within the Individual Exchanges, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 75, 91 (2014) (“The individuals in 
state high-risk pools are, by definition, the sickest of the sick and the costliest of the costly.”). 
 103 Compare Danielle K. Roberts, The Deadly Costs of Insulin, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.ajmc.com/contributor/danielle-roberts/2019/06/the-deadly-costs-of-insulin (stating that the cost of 
insulin is typically between $300 and $800+ per month), with Chen, supra note 7 (observing that the mean direct 
medical cost for patients receiving prophylactic treatment is $292,525). 
 104 See Sara R. Collins et al., Too High a Price: Out-of-Pocket Health Care Costs in the United States, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, Nov. 2014, at 1, 6 (“Nearly half (46%) of insured adults with incomes under 200 
percent of poverty said that because of their copayments or coinsurance, they had either not filled a prescription, 
not gone to the doctor when they were sick, skipped a medical test or follow-up visit recommended by a doctor, 
or not seen a specialist when they or their doctor thought they needed one . . . .”); see also Victor Laurion & 
Christopher Robertson, Ideology Meets Reality: What Works and What Doesn’t in Patient Exposure to Health 
Care Costs, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 62 (2018). 
 105 See, e.g., Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 99, at 242 (“For those without health insurance, 
premium rate increases have contributed to making many of them uninsured. Rate increases put affordable, 
quality coverage further out of reach for the uninsured.”).  
PERSAD_8.21.20 8/24/2020 11:43 AM 
1174 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1153 
financial security: Without progressivity, insurance ensures the financial 
security of expensive patients at the expense of financial security for others.106 
Rather than having fellow members of the same plan bear the entire cost of 
expensive patients’ treatment, it would be preferable to cover this cost through 
progressive public financing. Such an approach aligns with Dworkin’s 
framework: While prudent individuals might universally endorse covering the 
cost of common, moderate-cost treatments, making them appropriate for sharing 
through insurance, guaranteeing access to treatment like Jacob’s would only be 
endorsed by individuals who know they will be wealthy. Part III will discuss 
how existing policy already moves certain expensive patients’ costs off 
insurance onto public financing, and how policy innovations could serve to 
expand the scope of public financing.  
III. IMPLEMENTING FAIR SHARING 
A. Increasing Breadth Through Reinsurance 
1. Private Reinsurance 
Reinsurance is typically defined as an insurer’s purchase of insurance 
against a risk it has taken on.107 Commentators on both Mila’s and Jacob’s cases 
argue that if the firm responsible for paying claims—AOL (as self-insurer) or 
Wellmark—had been properly reinsured, its financial situation would not have 
been substantially disrupted.108 Private reinsurance, however, is typically 
ineffective at spreading the costs of chronic, rather than one-off, expensive 
patients. This is because it normally includes a “lasering” provision, which 
excludes costs attributable to specific expensive patients from coverage in future 
years.109 A policy that does not laser expensive patients is normally much 
 
 106 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1921 (discussing how the Affordable Care Act aims to promote financial 
security). 
 107 See, e.g., Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 93 F.3d 529, 532 n.4 
(9th Cir. 1996) (“‘Reinsurance’ is a means by which insurance companies spread their exposure to risk.”); 
Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Am. Glass Co., 166 F.2d 91, 94–95 (7th Cir. 1948) (“Reinsurance is defined to be 
a contract that one insurer makes with another to protect the first insurer from a risk it has already assumed.”). 
 108 FEI, supra note 19, at 275–76 (describing private reinsurance as “a financial backstop if, say, an 
employee needs heart surgery, or gets hit by a car—or has an extremely premature baby” and arguing that AOL 
was either unaffected by the cost of Mila’s treatment if reinsured or the victim of its own imprudence if not 
reinsured); Jacqueline Fox, The Private Insurance Market: Not Very Big and Not Insuring Much, Either, 46 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 877, 881 n.20 (2018) (arguing that Wellmark could, and likely did, protect against the cost of 
expensive patients like Jacob by purchasing a private reinsurance policy). 
 109 See, e.g., Myers v. Hog Slat, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1150 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (discussing the operation 
of a “laser” that excluded an expensive patient from private reinsurance coverage); see also Amy B. Monahan 
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costlier—so much so that the cost of reinsurance will substantially raise 
insurance premiums.110 And even in the absence of lasering, the private reinsurer 
could still raise premiums to recoup the cost of expensive patients’ treatment—
negotiated “no-laser” policies still allow for 40% to 55% year-over-year 
premium increases.111 All of this means that private reinsurance is unlikely to 
provide a technical fix for chronically expensive patients. While private 
reinsurance can spread unknown but potentially substantial risks, it does not 
address known high costs.112 
Some states have prohibited lasering by law, just as the ACA prohibited 
preexisting condition exclusions. Currently, lasering is prohibited in certain 
markets in Utah, California, Colorado, Maryland, and the District of 
Columbia,113 and lasering prohibitions have been proposed in Nevada.114 But 
prohibitions on lasering do not prevent reinsurers from simply raising plan 
premiums for firms that have high claims,115 in turn causing those firms to either 
drop reinsurance or pass on premium increases to employees; rather than 
broadening sharing, lasering prohibitions maintain the problems of narrow 
sharing. Public subsidies for reinsurance, discussed next, are likely a better 
solution than lasering prohibitions. 
 
& Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1966 (2013) (“[S]top-
loss insurers can apply a different attachment point to a particular employee or refuse to include that employee’s 
costs in coverage at all, a phenomenon known as ‘lasering.’”). 
 110 See Myers, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1151 (describing the premium increase of $100,000 required to eliminate 
a laser); Time to Take Another Look at Stop-Loss Insurance, BENEFITS COMPENSATION & HR CONSULTING 
(Segal Consulting), Jan. 2015, at 1, 3, https://archive.segalco.com/media/1321/jan2015.pdf (“Although it is 
possible to negotiate a no-laser contract, the economics must be reviewed with care. A no-laser contract will be 
more expensive . . . .”). 
 111 MEDCOST BENEFIT SERVS., STOP LOSS COVERAGE WHITE PAPER: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, LIMITING 
RISK 4 (2018). 
 112 HALL, supra note 8, at 37 (“[C]ommercial reinsurance will not cover high-cost patients that are already 
known.”).  
 113 CAL. INS. CODE § 10752.1 (West 2019) (“A stop-loss insurer shall not exclude any employee or 
dependent on the basis of an actual or expected health status-related factor.”); D.C. Code Ann. § 31-3822(c)(1) 
(West 2020) (“A stop-loss insurer shall not exclude any employee or dependent on the basis of an actual or 
expected health status-related factor.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-43-301(2)(a) (West 2019) (prohibiting 
“lasering” in the small-employer market); AL REDMER, JR., MD. INS. ADMIN., FINAL REPORT ON THE USE OF 
MEDICAL STOP-LOSS INSURANCE IN SELF-FUNDED EMPLOYER HEALTH PLANS IN MARYLAND 13, 17 (2016) 
(describing lasering prohibitions in Colorado and Maryland). 
 114 See Requiring Certain Policies for Stop-Loss Insurance Relating to Group Health Plans to Satisfy 
Certain Standards and Include Certain Provisions and Information, LCB File No. R127-18, 2019 NV REG TEXT 
493704 (proposed Feb. 7, 2019). 
 115 See, e.g., Dave Kirby, Texas Flood Doesn’t Stop SIIA Members from Commenting on Draft Stop-Loss 
Regs, SELF-INSURER, Dec. 2015, at 16, 16 (arguing that a lasering prohibition would lead to cost increases for 
employers). 
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2. State Reinsurance Programs 
Reinsurance that spreads the cost of known high-cost patients is often 
offered through government-operated programs.116 Although government-
sponsored reinsurance has been discussed since the 1950s,117 and is part of both 
the ACA and the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit program,118 recent 
cases involving expensive patients and concerns about unaffordable premiums 
have inspired increased interest, particularly at the state level. Alaska’s program 
represents a paradigm case for this renewed government involvement in 
reinsurance. In 2016, Alaska faced a 42% increase in ACA exchange premiums, 
substantially driven by the costs of a few expensive patients.119 It responded by 
passing legislation that covered medical costs associated with certain expensive 
conditions out of state general funds: 
Under Alaska’s program, people who suffer from 33 relatively 
expensive conditions, like end-stage renal disease, hemophilia or 
cerebral palsy, would still buy their plan from the state’s Blue Cross 
plan, Premera, and pay the same premiums as anyone else who relies 
on HealthCare.gov. But behind the scenes, their health care claims 
would be paid out of a $55 million state pool of reinsurance money, 
rather than Premera’s own funds.120 
The thirty-three conditions are defined by regulation,121 although a recent 
proposed rule would “remove the list of covered conditions eligible for payment 
through the reinsurance program from the regulations for ease of updating them 
as needed or at least annually.”122 
 
 116 See Hall, supra note 5, at 470. 
 117 Id. at 465. 
 118 See infra Part III.A.3; see also HALL, supra note 8, at 34. 
 119 Erin Mershon, Obamacare in Alaska: Cost-Control Plan Is Challenging but Working, ROLL CALL 
(June 19, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2017/06/19/obamacare-in-alaska-cost-control-plan-is-
challenging-but-working/; see also Timothy Jost, Alaska Reinsurance Plan Could Be Model for ACA Reform, 
Plus Other ACA Developments, HEALTH AFF.: FOLLOWING ACA (June 16, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
do/10.1377/hblog20160616.055420/full/ (noting that approximately a quarter of the costs on Alaska’s insurance 
exchange “came from just 37 cases”). 
 120 Mershon, supra note 119; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 31.505(a) (2019) (“There is 
established within the Comprehensive Health Insurance Association a program to reinsure high risk residents of 
this state diagnosed with one or more . . . covered conditions under 3 AAC 31.540. The program will be referred 
to as the Alaska Reinsurance Program.”); Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health 
Care, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 864 (2018) (briefly noting Alaska’s receipt of a federal waiver to fund its program); 
Sarah Kliff, How Alaska Fixed Obamacare, VOX (Apr. 13, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/4/13/15262614/obamacare-alaska-reinsurance. 
 121 tit. 3, § 31.540 (identifying conditions that define a high-risk resident). 
 122 Notice of Proposed Changes to the Alaska Comprehensive Health Insurance Association Reinsurance 
Program, 2018 AK REG TEXT 496721 (NS) (proposed June 29, 2018). 
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While Alaska’s program was enacted at a state rather than a national level, 
the $55 million described as a “state pool” in fact currently comes largely from 
national tax revenues. This is because Alaska has received a § 1332 Medicaid 
waiver that allows the state to fund the reinsurance program using federal money 
that its residents would have received in premium tax credits if the cost of 
premiums had not been reduced due to the reinsurance program.123 Although 
Alaska proposed to fund the program through a tax on insurers (including both 
health and non-health insurers), the waiver funds have funded most of the 
pool.124 The use of federal funds via waiver further enlarges the breadth of 
sharing for Alaska’s high-risk patients. It also increases progressivity, given that 
federal funds are obtained through progressive taxation. 
By limiting premium increases, Alaska’s program has enabled greater 
participation in the individual marketplace.125 It does so by making insurance 
more attractive to the “relatively healthy people who face especially high 
premiums, because they are older, too wealthy to qualify for subsidies, or both—
and who are bearing costs for sicker, more expensive enrollees.”126 Using 
sponsored reinsurance to cover the costs of the most expensive patients departs 
from Stone’s dictum that plan members should collectively shoulder the costs of 
the most expensive patients,127 but doing so also achieves greater financial 
security for households by lowering exorbitant premiums.128  
Although commentaries on the Alaska program, as well as the statutory text 
itself, call the program “reinsurance,” it and the similar programs discussed later 
in this subsection deviate from the classic definition of reinsurance. As discussed 
above, reinsurance typically protects insurers against having to make large, 
unknown payouts—it targets large payments, rather than expensive 
individuals.129 Because the Alaska program to “reinsure high risk residents”130 
 
 123 Timothy Jost, ACA Round-Up: CMS Approves Alaska 1332 Reinsurance Waiver, Ceases Premium 
Outlier Reviews, HEALTH AFF.: FOLLOWING ACA (July 12, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20170712.061031/full/ (noting that under the waiver, the “federal government will pass through funds to 
Alaska that it otherwise would have spent on premium tax credits had the benchmark premium not been 
reduced”). 
 124 Id. (“HHS expects the program to cost $59 million for 2018, of which CMS will provide $48.4 million 
on a quarterly basis and Alaska the rest.”). 
 125 Id. (“It is expected that because of the program premiums will be 20 percent lower in 2018 than they 
would otherwise be, and that 1,460 additional individuals will gain coverage.”). 
 126 Mershon, supra note 119. 
 127 Stone, supra note 47, at 292. 
 128 Mershon, supra note 119 (discussing a household that saved almost $10,000 per year in premiums). 
 129 RANDALL R. BOVBJERG, MO. FOUND. FOR HEALTH, IMPLEMENTING REINSURANCE: HEALTH 
INSURANCE REFORM IN MISSOURI (2006). 
 130 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 31.505(a) (2019). 
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provides coverage for known expensive patients, it and similar programs, 
discussed in Table 1 below, are better understood as public insurance programs 
for expensive patients—some have termed them “invisible high-risk pool[s].”131 
However, the program likely benefits politically by being understood as a clever 
piece of “wonkish” insurance restructuring,132 rather than as a new public 
insurance program that taxes and spends to pay for expensive patients (which 
might be unpopular on the right), or as a high-risk pool that relieves insurers and 
participants in Alaska’s ACA exchange of the responsibility to collectively 
assume the costs of fellow participants in exchange insurance plans (which 
might be unpopular on the left).  
As of November 2019, eleven other states, Colorado, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, and Wisconsin, have received waivers to develop reinsurance programs 
similar to Alaska’s program.133 Iowa and Oklahoma applied for waivers that 
included reinsurance as well as other changes, but ultimately withdrew them.134 
Arizona has adopted a reinsurance program confined to Medicaid enrollees, 
under which the state covers the costs of certain expensive treatments for 
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans, as well as covering all 
costs over $650,000.135 Connecticut and Wyoming have seen reinsurance 
proposals blocked in the legislative process, while several other states are in the 
process of initially developing these proposals.136 Although these reinsurance 
proposals share a similar structure, there are also important differences between 
them, summarized in Table 1.137 
 
 131 See Joel Allumbaugh et al., Invisible High-Risk Pools: How Congress Can Lower Premiums and Deal 
with Pre-Existing Conditions, HEALTH AFF.: FOLLOWING ACA (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
do/10.1377/hblog20170302.059003/full/. 
 132 E.g., Mershon, supra note 119 (describing the Alaska program as a “plan to bring down those sky-high 
health insurance costs, or at least to keep them from spiking again, through the wonky idea of reinsurance”); id. 
(“The idea isn’t nakedly partisan, like so many other health proposals, and doesn’t alienate the hospitals, doctors 
or insurance companies that often fight changes to their business models.”). 
 133 See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-innovation-waivers/ (providing an 
overview of state waiver applications, including applications for reinsurance waivers). 
 135 BRIGETTE COURTOT ET AL., URBAN INST., MEDICAID AND CHIP MANAGED CARE PAYMENT METHODS 
AND SPENDING IN 20 STATES 24 (2012) (describing the Arizona program). 
 136 See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 137 ALASKA DIV. OF INS., CMTY., & ECON. DEV., ALASKA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION (2016) [hereinafter 
ALASKA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; COURTOT ET AL., supra note 135; COLO. DIV. OF INS., COLORADO 1332 
STATE INNOVATION WAIVER REQUEST APPLICATION TO DEVELOP A STATE REINSURANCE PROGRAM (2019) 
[hereinafter COLORADO 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; Jenna Carlesso, Lamont: We’ll Revisit Public Option 
Health Care Issue Next Year, CT MIRROR (June 6, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/06/06/lamont-vows-to-
revive-public-option-health-care-issue-next-year/ (noting that Connecticut bill failed in state Senate); Christine 
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Stuart, Murphy Joins Call to End Trump’s Cheap Health Plans, STAMFORD ADVOCATE (Oct. 29, 2019, 3:34 
PM), https://www.stamfordadvocate.com/local/article/Murphy-joins-call-to-end-Trump-s-cheap-health-145718 
37.php?src=sthpln (noting that Connecticut bill failed in state Senate); DEL. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., 
STATE OF DELAWARE 1332 STATE INNOVATION WAIVER APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH A STATE REINSURANCE 
PROGRAM (2019) [hereinafter DELAWARE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; GEORGIA DRAFT SECTION 1332 WAIVER 
APPLICATION (2019); IOWA INS. DIV., IOWA STOPGAP MEASURE (2017) [hereinafter IOWA STOPGAP MEASURE]; 
IDAHO DEP’T OF INS., DRAFT FAIR ACCESS TO HEALTH COVERAGE WAIVER APPLICATION (2018); MD. HEALTH 
BENEFIT EXCH., MARYLAND 1332 STATE INNOVATION WAIVER APPLICATION TO ESTABLISH A STATE 
REINSURANCE PROGRAM (2018) [hereinafter MARYLAND 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; STATE OF MAINE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND APPLICATION FOR WAIVER UNDER SECTION 1332 OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2018) [hereinafter MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
MINNESOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION (2017) [hereinafter MINNESOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; MONT. 
GOVERNOR ET AL., MONTANA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION (2019) [hereinafter MONTANA 1332 WAIVER 
APPLICATION]; N.D. INS. DEP’T, NORTH DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION (2019) [hereinafter NORTH 
DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; NEW HAMPSHIRE’S PROPOSAL TO WAIVE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UNDER SECTION 1332 OF THE ACT, WAIVERS FOR STATE 
INNOVATION (2017); N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING & INS., NEW JERSEY 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION (2018) 
[hereinafter NEW JERSEY 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; SEC’Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1332 STATE 
INNOVATION WAIVER APPLICATION FOR THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA (2017) [hereinafter OKLAHOMA 1332 
WAIVER APPLICATION]; OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., OREGON 1332 DRAFT WAIVER APPLICATION 
(2017) [hereinafter OREGON 1332 DRAFT WAIVER APPLICATION]; Pa. Pub. L. No. 2019-42, 40 PA. C. S. (2019); 
R.I. HEALTH INS. COMM’R, RHODE ISLAND’S 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION (2019) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND 
1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; S.B. 845, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018); PREVENTION ALL., 
LEGISLATIVE BRIEF: HEALTH CARE ACCESS IN THE 2018 LEGISLATIVE SESSION (2018) (discussing the 
Washington proposed, but stalled, legislation); WIS. COMM’R OF INS., WISCONSIN 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION 
(2018) [hereinafter WISCONSIN 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION]; Seth Klamann, Wyoming Senate Kills Bill that 
Would’ve Lowered Insurance Premiums for 3,500 Wyomingites, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://trib. 
com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/health/wyoming-senate-kills-bill-that-would-ve-lowered-
insurance-premiums/article_083ee350-b90c-5377-bd55-7cee8ebd268f.html (noting that Wyoming bill failed in 
state Senate); see also Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., https:// 
www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Section_1332_State_Innovation_ 
Waivers- (last updated Feb. 25, 2020, 11:01 AM) (providing support for the waiver status of the following states: 
AK, CO, DE, GA, ID, IA, ME, MD, MN, MT, NJ, ND, OK, OR, RI, and WI). 
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In addition to the states listed in Table 1, reinsurance proposals have been 
examined for California by policy analysts,138 by the state governments in South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Vermont,139 and supported by elected officials in West 
 
 138 DENA B. MENDELSOHN, CONSUMERS UNION, CALIFORNIA STATE REINSURANCE: A PATH TO 
AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE? (2018). 
 139 S.D. OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT MGMT., 1332 WAIVER AND MARKETPLACE ANALYSIS 2 (2018); SENATE 
COMM. ON BUS. & COMMERCE, TEXAS WAIVER OPTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS 1, 13 (2018); Kevin 
Caudill, 1332 Waivers and the Cost of Health Insurance for Texans, CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 11, 
2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/12/1332-waivers-and-the-cost-of-health-insurance-for-texans/; Health 
Reform Task Force, Balance Billing, UTAH ST. LEGISLATURE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://le.utah.gov/av/ 
committeeArchive.jsp?mtgID=15998&timelineID=124949; VT. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVS., STATE-BASED 
REINSURANCE OPTIONS FOR VERMONT 2, 4 (2018). 
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Virginia.140 These proposals have typically received strong support from 
individual state residents and from nonprofits that focus on specific diseases, 
such as the American Heart Association and American Cancer Society.141 
Table 1 illustrates that states have made differing policy choices about 
reinsurance, including which claims are eligible for reinsurance; whether 
insurers remain responsible for some portion of eligible claims due to 
coinsurance; and how the reinsurance program is funded. These policy choices 
have economic implications, as spelled out in the actuarial analyses included in 
states’ waiver requests. But they also have normative implications that have 
largely gone unexplored.  
Most states use or propose “claims-based” eligibility criteria that define 
eligibility using the dollar amount of a claim.142 Alaska and Idaho, in contrast, 
use “conditions-based” eligibility that provides reinsurance for specific health 
problems.143 One recent report details the advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach.144 Maine uses a hybrid approach that provides reinsurance for a 
 
 140 Manchin Encourages West Virginia Insurance Commissioner to Prevent Healthcare Costs from 
Skyrocketing the Fall, JOE MANCHIN (June 7, 2018), https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/ 
manchin-encourages-west-virginia-insurance-commissioner-to-prevent-healthcare-costs-from-skyrocketing-
the-fall; see also Charles Gaba, West Virginia: *Final* Avg. 2020 #ACA Premiums: 6.7% Increase. . .for the 
Highest Premiums in the Country, ACASIGNUPS.NET (Oct. 31, 2019), https://acasignups.net/19/10/31/west-
virginia-final-avg-2020-aca-premiums-67-increasefor-highest-premiums-country (discussing WV’s failure to 
set up a reinsurance program).  
 141 See, e.g., COLORADO 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137 (showing endorsements from the 
Arthritis Foundation, Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, American Heart Association and American Stroke 
Association, and American Lung Association); DELAWARE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137 
(showing endorsements from the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, American Lung 
Association, American Heart Association and American Stroke Association, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, and 
National Organization for Rare Disorders); MARYLAND 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137 (showing 
endorsements from the American Lung Association, National Multiple Sclerosis Society, and Epilepsy 
Foundation); MONTANA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 122, 124, 126 (showing endorsements 
from the American Lung Association, Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, and National Psoriasis Foundation); NORTH 
DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 76–77, 80, 82, 83, 85, 87 (showing endorsements from 
the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, Arthritis Foundation, Leukemia and Lymphoma Society, 
American Heart Association and American Stroke Association, American Lung Association, and Cystic Fibrosis 
Foundation); RHODE ISLAND 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137 (showing endorsements from the 
American Lung Association, National Multiple Sclerosis Society, and New England Hemophilia 
Association/New England Bleeding Disorders Advocacy Coalition); WISCONSIN 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, 
supra note 137 (showing endorsements from the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network and National 
Multiple Sclerosis Society). 
 142 CMTY. CATALYST, THE ADVOCATE’S GUIDE TO: REINSURANCE 3 (2019). 
 143 Id. at 3–4 (“Alaska’s state-run reinsurance program uses this [conditions-based] approach, covering the 
claims for individuals with 33 different high-cost conditions.”). Claims-based and conditions-based eligibility 
each have advantages and disadvantages. Id. 
 144 Id.  
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specified list of conditions and permits insurers to opt into reinsurance for other 
costly claims.145 Most states also use coinsurance, which leaves the insurer 
responsible for some or all claims.146 And many do not provide reinsurance for 
the portion of a claim that goes beyond a cap, paralleling the pre-ACA practice 
of imposing annual limits on individual insurance and also mimicking the 
transitional reinsurance program that was available through the ACA between 
2014 and 2016, which capped reinsurance at $250,000.147  
Dworkin’s account of fairness in health insurance provides a useful 
framework for considering the normative implications of caps, coinsurance, and 
the choice between claims-based and condition-based reinsurance. As Dworkin 
notes, the case for providing treatments to expensive patients is different from 
the case for providing preventive care or lower-cost lifesaving treatments.148 
Spending millions of dollars to treat a small number of expensive patients is 
justifiable only in a society where some individuals have millions of dollars in 
income and wealth; whereas, spending a lesser sum of money to treat widespread 
health problems would be justifiable even in a highly equal society.149 These 
fairness considerations favor reinsurance designs that do not cap the dollar 
amounts eligible for reinsurance, because caps shift the costs of the most 
expensive patients back onto the shoulders of a narrower pool. As discussed in 
the next subsection, the federal high-cost risk pooling program does meet some 
of the costs of patients whose bills exceed $1 million. It also favors reinsurance 
designs that, like Iowa’s, have a high eligibility threshold,150 or conditions-based 
insurance designs; these designs focus on patients whose conditions are costly 
enough to make narrower sharing normatively controversial. In contrast, 
reinsurance is harder to justify for fairly low-cost claims, which counts against 
designs like Oklahoma’s that provide reinsurance for claims as low as $15,000. 
The question of how states should fund reinsurance has presented the most 
serious political and normative disputes. The three most popular funding 
approaches are taxes on insurers, appropriations from the state’s general fund, 
 
 145 MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 5–6; see CMTY. CATALYST, supra note 142, at 
4. 
 146 IOWA STOPGAP MEASURE, supra note 137, at 23 (discussing the use of coinsurance for claims from 
$100,000 to $3 million, combined with complete reinsurance for claims above $3 million). 
 147 E.g., WISCONSIN 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 4 (establishing an attachment point of 
$50,000 and a reinsurance cap of $250,000); Timothy Jost, CMS Expects to Reinsure 55.1 Percent of Claims 
Between $45,000 and $250,000, HEALTH AFF.: FOLLOWING ACA (June 20, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs. 
org/do/10.1377/hblog20160620.055457/full/ (describing ACA transitional reinsurance). 
 148 See supra Part II.B. 
 149 See Dworkin, Distribution of Health Care, supra note 72, at 888. 
 150 IOWA STOPGAP MEASURE, supra note 137, at 23. 
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and proceeds from state individual mandates that require uninsured residents to 
make a payment to the state (just as the ACA’s individual mandate required 
uninsured individuals to pay a tax to the federal government).151 Each approach 
presents challenges. Taxes on insurers are politically popular and do not further 
stress already-strained state general funds, but they are typically passed on 
directly to insured patients. Objections from state legislators as well as insurer 
associations like America’s Health Insurance Plans derailed efforts in 
Connecticut and Wyoming to fund reinsurance through taxes on insurers,152 and 
may have led to New Jersey changing its funding source to general funds.153 
Objections to taxes on insurers are not unique to right-wing or elite advocacy: 
Several commenters on Oklahoma’s proposal raised concerns about the burden 
that taxes on insurers would impose on tribal employers and members of tribes, 
without a corresponding benefit.154  
The use of state general funds to pay for reinsurance, meanwhile, has been 
defended by insurers, but criticized from both the left and the right as an unfair 
bailout for insurers and a low-priority use of scarce funding.155 Individual 
mandate funding is the least politically controversial, but produces a smaller and 
more variable revenue stream, and has been criticized for transferring resources 
from working-class households who make most of the individual mandate 
payments to middle-class and wealthy households who benefit most from 
reinsurance.156 Problems with these prominent funding approaches have spurred 
 
 151 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 152 See Carlesso, supra note 137; Klamann, supra note 137; see also MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, 
supra note 137 (“[W]e believe it is important that the funding source be broad-based, rather than an assessment 
on any health insurance market that would only serve to make coverage in those markets less affordable. Any 
premium or provider taxes simply result in higher premiums and serve to destabilize the markets being 
assessed.”). 
 153 See NEW JERSEY 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at app. attachment 8 (New Jersey 
Business & Industry Association letter dated June 29, 2018) (discussing amendment to remove tax on all 
individual and small-group health plans). 
 154 OKLAHOMA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 127–28. 
 155 CMTY. CATALYST, supra note 142, at 6 (“Within the advocacy community, reinsurance can be 
perceived as a ‘bailout’ to insurance companies. While the intent behind the program is to lower premiums for 
consumers, providing direct payments to insurers has drawn some criticism.”); HALL, supra note 8, at 34 
(“[S]ome critics continue to characterize reinsurance as little more than an insurer ‘bail out . . . .’”); MINNESOTA 
1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 63 (“Commenters mentioned that they view the MPSP as bailing 
out profitable insurance companies.”); NEW JERSEY 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at app. 
attachment 7 (discussing hospitals’ proposal to tax insurers rather than drawing on the general fund); Julie 
Rovner & Rachel Bluth, 5 Governors Press Congress for Fast Bucks to Secure Obamacare Market in 2018, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 7, 2017), https://khn.org/news/5-governors-press-congress-for-fast-bucks-to-
secure-obamacare-market-in-2018/. But see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Stabilizing Forces, ACTUARY, Oct.–Nov. 
2016, at 34, 37 (rejecting bailout critique). 
 156 MENDELSOHN, supra note 138, at 12 (“[I]f a reinsurance program—which primarily benefits 
individuals earning over 400 percent of the federal poverty level, and the federal government—were funded by 
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some states to seek more innovative sources of funding, such as taxes on 
providers (in Colorado) or fees collected by operating a state-level ACA 
exchange rather than relying on the federal exchange (Pennsylvania); 
commenters on state proposals have also suggested “sin taxes” such as tobacco 
or alcohol taxes.157 
The normative analysis also favors funding reinsurance through a source 
other than a tax on insurers. Taxes on insurers will be regressively passed 
through to insured individuals as premium increases,158 as some opponents of 
Oklahoma’s proposal noted in their response during the public comment 
period.159 In contrast, funding from general revenues—which can be obtained 
through progressive taxation—could place more of the cost on better-off 
individuals. If funding from general revenues is impossible, however, it is fairer 
to tax all insurers than only private insurers, since taxing all insurers at least 
broadens sharing even if it does not make it more progressive.160 Many critics 
have disagreed, however, arguing that it is unfair to raise costs for individuals 
with employer-based insurance in order to lower costs for purchasers in the 
individual marketplaces.161 Another option that could avoid the problem of 
passing on the tax burden as a regressive premium increase would be to tax 
providers rather than insurers.162  
 
the individual mandate penalty, the effect would be that higher-income Californians would benefit from a 
program financed by their lower-income neighbors.”). 
 157 NEW JERSEY 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at app. attachment 7. 
 158 Cf. Cynthia Goff, An Individual Mandate to Have Health Care Coverage: How Minnesota Can Turn 
This Key to Health Care Reform, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 85, 99 (2007) (discussing how Minnesota’s 
high-risk pool is “funded by an assessment on all insurers in the State, which is then passed on to all insured 
people in the State through their premiums”). 
 159 Public Comments on Waiver During Federal Comment Period, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/Downloads/ 
Public-Comments-Federal-OK.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (comprising the public comments on Oklahoma’s 
application from the Self-Insurance Institute of America, ERISA Industry Committee, HR Policy Association, 
and National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors); see also MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 
137 (public comment from Anthem dated May 2, 2018) (discussing the argument that “premium or provider 
taxes simply result in higher premiums and serve to destabilize the markets being assessed”). 
 160 Contra MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137. 
 161 MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137 (public comment from Anthem dated May 2, 2018) 
(reporting insurer’s “concerns about an assessment on fully insured and self-funded accounts” because it 
“increases costs . . . without a corresponding benefit”); id. (public comment from Maine State Chamber of 
Commerce dated May 1, 2018) (“[A]ll employers are being asked to subsidize one segment of the insurance 
market by paying a substantial assessment, when they themselves are struggling to pay for their own polices 
[sic].”); OREGON 1332 DRAFT WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 89–93; cf. DELAWARE 1332 WAIVER 
APPLICATION, supra note 137, at attachment 5 (Aflac letter dated June 14, 2019) (arguing that insurers “should 
not be included in the funding base for a program that does not impact or benefit them”). 
 162 Cf. COLORADO 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 4 (funding reinsurance via tax on 
hospitals); MINNESOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 4 (proposing to fund program through a 
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Some states have attempted to bypass or obscure the challenges of funding 
insurance programs by framing taxes on insurers in ways that are at best 
shortsighted and at worst misleading. Many make the implausible assumption 
that taxing employer-based insurance will not affect the cost or benefit 
generosity of employer-based insurance,163 or that taxes on insurers won’t be 
passed down to individuals.164 In the public presentation of their reinsurance 
plan, North Dakota claimed that it was funded by “assessments against North 
Dakota health insurance companies,” omitting the fact that those assessments 
were deductible for insurers and that funding therefore ultimately came from 
general revenues.165 It is more plausible that the taxes needed to fund reinsurance 
will have genuine but small effects.166  
The complexity of reinsurance also obfuscates the winners and losers from 
the program. Consider the case of Alaska: Without the reinsurance program, 
premiums would have risen substantially in order to cover the costs of expensive 
patients; federal tax credits would have subsidized premiums for Alaskans under 
400% of the poverty line, but better-off Alaskans would have been asked to 
shoulder the burdens of paying the rest of expensive patients’ costs. The 
reinsurance program, coupled with the waiver, serves to redirect federal 
revenues to higher-income Alaskans who would not have received income-
based ACA subsidies.167 Commenters on several state reinsurance plans have 
 
tax on providers); Coleman Drake et al., Estimated Costs of a Reinsurance Program to Stabilize the Individual 
Health Insurance Market: National- and State-Level Estimates, 56 J. HEALTH CARE ORG. PROVISION & 
FINANCING 1, 2 (2019). 
 163 E.g., MAINE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 10 (“MGARA is not estimated to impact 
premium rates materially for employer-sponsored insurance.”); MARYLAND 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra 
note 137, at 3 (“Employer contributions and employee wages are not expected to be affected by the waiver.”); 
OREGON 1332 DRAFT WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 8 (“Although employer health plans will have 
a 0.3 percent assessment to fund the ORP, employer contributions and employee wages are not expected to be 
affected by the waiver.”). 
 164 MONTANA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 127 (“Insurance companies have to pay a 
tax of 1.2% on premiums, not individuals.”).  
 165 See NORTH DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 3, 118. 
 166 See OKLAHOMA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 19, 23 (“Employers who offer 
commercial insurance that is subject to the assessment may see a slight increase in premiums due to the 
assessment. However, it is not anticipated that this assessment will impact employers’ decision to offer coverage 
to their employees.”); cf. DELAWARE 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at attachment 6 (email 
correspondence from IFS Benefits, LLC sent May 31, 2019) (providing commenter’s question: “Am I correct 
that if the 1332 waiver program is implemented it will increase costs for employers due to the premium 
assessment fee that will be applied to health insurance companies. It would be expected that the health insurance 
companies would then pass this on to employers by increasing their premiums. Correct?”). 
 167 Cf. OKLAHOMA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 7, 17 (predicting that nearly all 
households enrolling because of reinsurance will be those above 400% of the federal poverty line); WISCONSIN 
1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at attachment 5 (comments by Wisconsin Alliance for Women’s 
Health and Kids Forward). 
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noted that the savings flow mainly to higher-income consumers, and have 
questioned the prioritization of reinsurance rather than efforts to assist lower-
income buyers such as Medicaid expansion.168 In describing the benefits of their 
programs, some states have skirted the fact that reinsurance almost exclusively 
benefits buyers with incomes above 400% of the poverty line: For instance, 
Alaska argues that the benefits of reinsurance “are shared by the entire individual 
health insurance market regardless of income, age, race and ethnic group, or any 
other demographic characteristic.”169 But, because the ACA’s income-based 
subsidies mean that lower-income households typically do not pay list price for 
instance, these benefits are not shared equally “regardless of income.” 
That the benefits of reinsurance flow primarily to better-off households 
under the ACA’s current subsidy structure indicates that reinsurance—even 
though it broadens sharing for expensive patients—replicates many of the same 
policy outcomes that can be achieved by directly subsidizing premiums for 
better-off households. The current structure of advance premium tax credits, 
which use tax revenues to cover all health insurance premiums for lower-income 
households that exceed a specified percentage of income, can be understood as 
creating broad, progressive sharing for the costs that expensive patients impose 
on these low-income buyers. California has extended premium subsidies to 
households over 400% to households below 600% of the poverty line, and 
proposals have been introduced at the federal level to provide all households 
with subsidies.170 Some commenters have argued that simply subsidizing more-
advantaged households would be more effective than reinsurance at increasing 
insurance enrollment,171 and likely also more politically popular.172 But 
reinsurance has the advantage of lowering costs for lower-income households 
that do not receive subsidies, such as families that fall into the Medicaid-
expansion gap and—potentially—documented immigrants who decline 
available subsidies because of concerns about the “public charge” provision.173 
 
 168 OKLAHOMA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 120 (noting that “decreased premiums 
projected would benefit those above 400% FPL in the individual market” and asking whether steps are “being 
taken to provide coverage to those who are uninsured because of not expanding Medicaid”). 
 169 ALASKA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 5; see also MINNESOTA 1332 WAIVER 
APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 7 (“The benefits of an approved waiver will be shared by the entire non-
grandfathered individual health insurance market, without regard to enrollees’ income, age, health condition, 
tobacco status, area of residence, race, carrier selection, network selection, or metal level selection.”).  
 170 See Govind Persad, Choosing Affordability in Health Insurance, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819, 829-30 
(2020). 
 171 See, e.g., HALL, supra note 8, at 39–40; Charles Gaba, Minnesota: #TeamReinsurance Dukes It Out 
with #TeamSubsidies, ACASIGNUPS.NET (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:02 AM), http://acasignups.net/19/03/22/minnesota-
teamreinsurance-dukes-it-out-teamsubsidies. 
 172 See Gaba, supra note 171. 
 173 See Jeanne Lambrew & Jen Mishory, Closing the Medicaid Coverage Gap, CENTURY FOUND. (July 
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Last, commenters on many of the state reinsurance proposals also note that 
reinsurance does not combat the high medical costs that make patients expensive 
in the first place, and advocate for efforts to address medical costs.174 Part III.C 
discusses potential strategies for reining in high costs. 
3. Federal-Level Reinsurance 
The ACA incorporated publicly provided reinsurance as a transition 
program during its first two years.175 The ACA’s reinsurance structure, however, 
only covered expenses between $45,000 ($90,000 in 2016) and $250,000, with 
a variable coinsurance rate, and was phased out in 2016. Additionally, it was 
funded through a tax on insurers.176 As discussed above, insurers simply pass 
these taxes through to their customers in the form of higher premiums. As such, 
the original ACA reinsurance program achieved greater breadth of sharing, but 
not greater progressivity: Each insured individual paid a similar amount in 
higher premiums in order to cover the costs of the most expensive patients. The 
ACA also currently includes a reinsurance program for patients with claims 
above $1 million, although this program covers only 60% of costs.177 
Medicare’s Part D prescription drug coverage also includes a reinsurance 
program, which currently covers 80% of the cost of drugs once a patient’s 
spending crosses a specified threshold (currently just over $8,000 per year).178 
Part D reinsurance spending has been growing rapidly due to increasing drug 
prices, prompting the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to recommend 
that reinsurance rates be reduced dramatically to cover only 20% of drug costs 
 
31, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/report/closing-medicaid-coverage-gap/; Sara Rosenbaum, The New “Public 
Charge” Rule Affecting Immigrants Has Major Implications for Medicaid and Entire Communities, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/new-public-charge-
rule-affecting-immigrants-has-major-implications-medicaid-and-entire. 
 174 E.g., MENDELSOHN, supra note 138, at 3 (“Finally, reinsurance is an efficient mechanism for removing 
costly claims from rate setting, but it does not address the underlying healthcare costs that caused large bills in 
the first place.”); NORTH DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 90; OKLAHOMA 1332 WAIVER 
APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 120 (“Commenter had a concern that health care and health insurance are two 
separate issues. For example, health insurance has its own administrative complexity, which might potentially 
divert resources from needy people. Commenter would like the legislature to look at health care costs and ways 
to improve the health care system.”); id. at 122 (“Insurance carriers can’t reduce prices unless providers do. 
Where are they? Response: . . . We do acknowledge that we have to bend the health care cost curve.”); see also 
HALL, supra note 8, at 36. 
 175 See Jost, supra note 147. 
 176 See HALL, supra note 8, at 33. 
 177 Scott E. Harrington, Stabilizing Individual Health Insurance Markets with Subsidized Reinsurance, 
LDI ISSUE BRIEF, Sept. 2017, at 1, 6 n.7 (explaining the Federal High-Cost Risk Pooling Program in the ACA). 
 178 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 
390 tbl.14-1 (2019); see also Jost, supra note 155, at 37. 
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in order to give insurers an incentive to reduce drug spending.179 An alternative 
to reducing reinsurance for drugs, discussed in Part III.C, would be to take other 
steps to reduce drug costs themselves in a systematic way. Most recently, several 
health reform proposals at the federal level have proposed the creation of a 
federal reinsurance program or federal grants to states to develop their own 
programs.180 
Breadth and progressivity could both be improved by placing expensive 
patients onto a publicly funded insurance plan. This already happens for some 
categories of expensive patients. Nationally, patients with end-stage renal 
disease (ESRD) who require dialysis, regardless of age, are covered by 
Medicare.181 Some have described the ESRD program as using Medicare as a 
“high-risk pool” for people with renal disease.182 More generally, Medicare itself 
could be understood as a policy decision to move older and more expensive 
patients from private insurance onto a publicly funded program.183  
4. Reimagining Reinsurance 
As the Commonwealth Fund notes, “a more comprehensive national effort 
to help private insurers manage unpredictable risks in individual health 
insurance markets has enduring appeal.”184 The most normatively compelling 
design for a national reinsurance program would mix and match design features 
from various state plans. It would fund reinsurance via a broad-based, 
progressive tax, rather than an industry-specific tax that is passed on as a fee to 
insured individuals and would offer reinsurance to both exchange plans and 
employer-based plans. It would use modest coinsurance, to maintain incentives 
for insurers to control costs, but no cap on reinsurance. It would either have a 
 
 179 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 178, at 394–95; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GEN., HIGH-PRICE DRUGS ARE INCREASING FEDERAL PAYMENTS FOR MEDICARE PART D CATASTROPHIC 
COVERAGE 3 (2017). 
 180 See generally Jeanne Lambrew, A Quick Look at Congress’s Ideas to Improve Private Health 
Insurance, CENTURY FOUND. (June 26, 2019), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/quick-look-congresss-ideas-
improve-private-health-insurance/ (summarizing proposals). 
 181 H. Bradley Southern, Note, Medicare’s End-Stage Renal Disease Program: Its Development and 
Implications for Health Care Policy, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 226 (1989) (observing that the ESRD program 
“is unique because it represents the first time a specific medical disease category has been isolated by the federal 
government for almost 100% federally-funded treatment”). 
 182 Sarah Kliff, High-Risk Pools: The Newest Proposal to Fix the GOP’s Health Plan, Explained, VOX 
(May 3, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/5/3/15529428/republican-high-risk-
pools. 
 183 See KAREN DAVIS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE: 50 YEARS OF ENSURING COVERAGE 
AND CARE 22 (2015) (“[N]atural market forces cause private insurers to avoid those at highest risk.”). 
 184 Blumenthal et al., supra note 134. 
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claims-based structure with a reasonably high attachment point, or a hybrid 
conditions-based and claims-based structure, with the threshold for reinsurance 
varying by condition. 
This national reinsurance program could also be structured as a national 
catastrophic-cost program that directly covers expensive patients rather than 
reimbursing insurers, akin to the ESRD program. Unlike beleaguered state risk 
pools, the national program could leverage the federal government’s greater 
resources and financial flexibility to create a program that (like the ESRD 
program) has no caps, lifetime limits, or other issues that bedeviled state risk 
pools. It could also achieve cost savings by reimbursing at Medicare rates. As 
Part III.B argues, the most normatively appealing way of funding it would be 
via a highly progressive tax, akin to the ACA’s Medicare tax. 
The distinction between a national reinsurance program and a national high-
risk pool program would largely be semantic, rather than substantive.185 A recent 
normative critique of high-risk pools, which argues that “high-risk pools are 
unjust” regardless of their efficiency, might therefore apply to the state and 
national reinsurance programs discussed above or to a more comprehensive 
national reinsurance program.186 This critique argues that high-risk pools are 
unjust because they (1) require high-risk individuals to pay more for their 
insurance, (2) deny high-cost patients procedural fairness by refusing to weigh 
their claims against those of lower-cost patients, and (3) segment the population 
on the basis of an unchosen characteristic.187 While these objections are 
compelling for certain high-risk pool designs, they do not apply to most of the 
reinsurance programs discussed. 
The first critique, that high-risk pools require high-cost patients to pay more, 
only applies to high-risk pools that are funded via premiums on expensive 
patients, not to “invisible” high-risk pools that are funded via taxation. The 
ESRD program, for instance, does not require ESRD patients to pay more for 
insurance than others do—in fact, they pay less for insurance because they pay 
 
 185 See Allumbaugh et al., supra note 131 (describing government-sponsored reinsurance as a type of high-
risk pool). 
 186 Jeremy Kingston Cynamon, Normative Concerns with High-Risk Pools, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 766, 
766 (2018); see also id. at 772 n.5 (“Many of the arguments here, though directed principally at high-risk pools, 
apply to other mechanisms for fragmenting solidarity in the health insurance market.”). Reinsurance programs 
like Alaska’s might also be understood as a mechanism for fragmenting solidarity, given that they are framed as 
protecting the “healthy people who face especially high premiums” from “bearing costs for sicker, more 
expensive enrollees.” See Mershon, supra note 119. 
 187 Cynamon, supra note 186, at 771. 
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Medicare rates. The same is true for state reinsurance and for the national 
reinsurance program.188  
Similarly, the second objection, that high-risk pools deny high-cost patients 
procedural fairness by refusing to weigh their claims against those of lower-cost 
patients, only applies if high-risk pools apply different criteria for access to 
interventions than other forms of insurance do. But uniform criteria for access 
can be applied without a “unitary risk pool.”189 As in the Alaska reinsurance 
program, a different source of payment for expensive patients could coexist with 
a uniform standard for treatment access for all patients.  
The third objection, that high-risk pools segment the population on the basis 
of an unchosen characteristic, also applies to reinsurance. However, the 
objection is not compelling: Segmentation on the basis of unchosen 
characteristics is often justifiable, and appropriately designed high-risk pools 
will tend to ameliorate stigma rather than exacerbating it. First, fairness often 
requires treating unequals unequally, rather than treating everyone identically.190 
Unchosen inequalities can justify differential but fair treatment: For instance, 
the ESRD program segments the population on the basis of an unchosen 
characteristic in order to address the special needs of ESRD patients. Second, by 
making sharing broader and more progressive, a well-designed high-risk pool 
will reduce resentment of high-risk patients. The objection claims that whereas 
“in a society that does not make use of high-risk pools I might encounter Frank 
as my friendly neighbor who unfortunately suffers from a chronic illness,” the 
use of high-risk pools makes me “more prone to encounter Frank as that high-
risk person who lives in my building . . . and consumes more resources than he 
contributes.”191 It also claims that high-risk pools make a patient’s illness, rather 
than the cost of treating it, salient, and inflict on high-cost patients a stigmatized 
“socio-legal identity” with “inferior benefits and privileges.”192 Both these 
claims are dubious. In Jacob’s and Mila’s cases, the absence of a high-risk pool 
led neighbors and coworkers to become resentful of the high costs they were 
 
 188 See, e.g., Mershon, supra note 119 (illustrating how those covered by a state reinsurance program pay 
the same premiums as others). 
 189 But see Cynamon, supra note 186, at 770. 
 190 See, e.g., Knight v. State, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1193 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (discussing “vertical equity which 
is the unequal treatment of unequals”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Lawrence O. Gostin & David P. Fidler, Biosecurity Under the Rule of Law, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 437, 
462 (2007) (“Aristotle expressed the ideal of justice as the equal treatment of equals and the unequal treatment 
of unequals.”). 
 191 Cynamon, supra note 186, at 768. 
 192 Id. 
PERSAD_8.21.20 8/24/2020 11:43 AM 
1192 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1153 
singled out to pay,193 whereas the use of a broadly funded high-risk pool would 
have attenuated these costs and decreased resentment. And high-risk pools 
constructed like Alaska’s program do not treat patients in an outwardly different 
way or impose inferior benefits and privileges. The ESRD program, in fact, 
arguably confers superior benefits on patients with kidney failure in response to 
their distinctive needs.  
Rather than the critique’s extension of philosophical theories of social 
recognition to claim that high-risk pools have deleterious “social-recognitional 
implications,”194 a more apposite philosophical insight comes from work by 
John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and others on the “division of moral labor” between 
individuals and social institutions.195 Resentment is better mitigated by 
collectively supported institutions that meet needs without allowing those needs 
to excessively intrude on individuals’ daily lives than by mandating direct, 
interpersonal mutual aid. As Nagel puts it, 
[I]t clearly is a desirable feature of a social order that within it, people 
should not be too constrained in the pursuit of their own lives by 
constant demands for impartial attention to the welfare of others. . . . 
But this is an adequate individual morality only within the context of a 
societal framework that does much more to satisfy the claims of 
impartial concern which other lives make on us.196 
A broadly and progressively funded reinsurance program can serve as a crucial 
institutional element of a desirable societal framework by shielding poor and 
middle-class individuals from frequent and burdensome demands to contribute 
to the needs of expensive patients, while at the same time ensuring that those 
patients’ needs are met. 
B. Progressive Financing Through a Rescue Tax 
Scholarship in tax defines a progressive tax system as “one in which the 
average tax rate—the proportion of income paid in taxes—increases with 
income.”197 The concept of progressivity has also been applied to the funding of 
 
 193 See FEI, supra note 19, at 269–71 (describing online reactions); id. at 250–51 (describing experience 
of another parent of a child who incurred high medical bills). 
 194 Cynamon, supra note 186, at 766, 772 n.13 (proposing to evaluate high-risk pools using a theory of 
social recognition developed by G.W.F. Hegel, Axel Honneth, and others). 
 195 See James D. Nelson, The Trouble with Corporate Conscience, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1655, 1665 & n.50 
(2018) (collecting sources on the “division of moral labor”). 
 196 THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 83 (1991) (emphasis in original). 
 197 David Kamin, Note, What Is a Progressive Tax Change?: Unmasking Hidden Values in Distributional 
Debates, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241, 243 (2008). 
PERSAD_8.21.20 8/24/2020 11:43 AM 
2020] THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 1193 
social programs more generally.198 For instance, while Medicare is partially 
funded by participant-paid premiums (a regressive fee), the greatest proportion 
of its funding comes from general tax revenues (financed through progressive 
taxation), and a substantial proportion also comes from payroll taxation, which 
has a flat structure.199 
Public reinsurance programs have been funded in several ways, varying from 
more to less progressive. Fees are typically the least progressive funding 
strategy: Even though fees have the same absolute cost to all payers, their cost 
to the poor as a percentage of income is much greater than their cost to the 
rich.200 Although reinsurance is typically not funded directly through fees, 
taxing insurers to fund reinsurance—as Alaska initially did and many other 
states currently do201—will ultimately have similar effects to a fee, because 
insurers will pass the tax through to customers without regard to customer 
wealth.202 Taxing insurers to fund reinsurance may seem fair because 
reinsurance benefits insurers by protecting them from the cost of paying for 
expensive patients’ treatment,203 but insurers’ ability to pass taxes through to 
customers makes the distributive impact of taxing insurers unattractive. 
Other states have proposed to fund reinsurance via taxes on specific 
unhealthful products, such as tobacco.204 While there are compelling policy 
 
 198 E.g., Tom Miller, Measuring Distributive Injustice on a Different Scale, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Autumn 2006, at 231, 235 (analyzing the progressivity of Medicare). 
 199 See Theodore R. Marmor & Jacob S. Hacker, Medicare Reform and Social Insurance: The Clashes of 
2003 and Their Potential Fallout, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 475, 480 (2005) (describing Medicare’s 
funding structure); Jill R. Horwitz, The Virtues of Medicare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2008) (reviewing 
DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006)) (similar). 
 200 See Stephanie R. Hoffer, Redirecting Direct Democracy: Non-Essential Spending as Political Speech, 
95 MARQ. L. REV. 563, 614 n.211 (2012) (“Flat fees are regressive because they comprise a greater proportion 
of the income or wealth of taxpayers at the lower end of the economic spectrum.”). 
 201 See Mershon, supra note 119. 
 202 See Arthur C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the Income Tax Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, 19 YALE L.J. 505, 507 (1910) (“[A] tax . . . levied against the income of insurance companies 
derived in part from premiums on policies . . . fell ultimately, not upon the insurance company, but upon the 
policyholder, whose premium was proportionately increased by the amount of the tax levied.”); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance 
Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 73 (1993) (observing that insurance companies pass fees through to 
policyholders). 
 203 See, e.g., MINNESOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 63 (“Commenters mentioned that 
they view the [reinsurance program] as bailing out profitable insurance companies.”). 
 204 FAMILIES USA, REINSURANCE: A PRIMER 13 (2008) (suggesting tobacco tax revenues as a source for 
reinsurance funding); see also COLO. COMM’R OF INS., A REPORT REGARDING SB17-300: COLORADO HIGH-RISK 
HEALTH COVERAGE STUDY fig.6 (2017) (suggesting tobacco or marijuana tax revenues as a source for 
reinsurance funding); HEALTHSOURCE RI & OFFICE OF THE HEALTH INS. COMM’R STATE OF R.I., MARKET 
STABILITY WORKGROUP “2.0” (2018) (discussing use of tobacco tax revenue for reinsurance). 
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justifications for tobacco taxes, the link between tobacco and reinsurance is 
weak, given that most expensive patients’ medical costs are not attributable to 
tobacco use. Raising revenue via Pigouvian (i.e., behavior-modifying) taxes, 
such as tobacco taxes, also has the recognized flaw that Pigouvian taxes raise 
less revenue as they become more effective at disincentivizing socially 
undesirable behavior.205 It is also challenging to design Pigouvian taxes to be 
progressive.206 Some have criticized tobacco taxes, for instance, as regressive, 
although their health benefits for poor consumers makes that charge dubious.207 
Still other states fund reinsurance out of general revenues.208 The 
progressivity of this strategy depends on the progressivity of the tax system used 
to collect those revenues. Taking a broader view, it also depends on where the 
revenues would otherwise have been spent. In Wisconsin, state-funded subsidies 
for reinsurance—which typically lower the premiums for middle-class patients 
who are too well off to receive ACA tax credits—have been criticized for 
potentially taking money from Medicaid funding and other programs that help 
lower-income residents.209 
Part II’s discussion suggests that there is a distinctive case for progressivity 
in funding expensive patients’ care, one that goes beyond the typical case for 
progressivity in taxation. Typically, progressive taxation is justified on the basis 
that better-off individuals experience fewer utility losses from paying taxes than 
worse-off ones do, or that economically worse-off individuals have a 
fundamentally stronger claim to resources.210 But taxation to fund expensive 
 
 205 See Nadav Shoked, Cities Taxing New Sins: The Judicial Embrace of Local Excise Taxation, 79 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 801, 811 (2018) (“Consider the local cigarette tax. If the tax effectively promotes the alleged goal of 
depressing the consumption of the product deemed harmful . . . , then the number of cigarettes purchased will 
decline, and the revenue raised through the tax . . . will decrease.”). 
 206 See Henry Ordower et al., Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution, and 
Constitutional Limitations, 61 HOW. L.J. 113, 133 (2017) (discussing regressive effects of tobacco taxes). 
 207 Cf. Lauren Kaplin, A National Strategy to Combat the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. 
JUV. L. & POL’Y 347, 391 (2011) (arguing that tobacco taxes increase overall utility for lower-income 
consumers); April Schweitzer, Soda Taxes: A Missed Opportunity or an Untested Tactic?, 20 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 112, 118 (2011), https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/healthlaw/pdfs/ 
advancedirective/pdfs/issue6/schweitzer.pdf (similar). 
 208 COLORADO 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 4; GEORGIA DRAFT SECTION 1332 WAIVER 
APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 5–6; MINNESOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 4; NORTH 
DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 2–3; RHODE ISLAND MARKET STABILITY WORKGROUP, 
supra note 204; WISCONSIN 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 3. 
 209 See Public Comments on Waiver During Federal Comment Period, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/State-Innovation-Waivers/ 
Downloads/WI-Federal-Public-Comments-Merged.PDF (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (listing public comments on 
Wisconsin’s application from Katie Pope, Abby Hammes, and ABC for Health). 
 210 See Kamin, supra note 197, at 269–71. 
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patients’ care can also draw on Dworkin’s account of insurance, which supports 
the idea that individuals who are much wealthier than they would be in an ideal 
society can be asked to contribute more money to expensive patients’ 
treatment.211 Put another way, there is no single answer to the often-asked 
question of how much “we” should pay to assist an expensive patient; rather, the 
answer changes depending on who in society is paying.212 
Dworkin’s approach supports funding reinsurance through a dedicated 
progressive tax. One such option would be a “rescue tax” that pays for very 
costly interventions by taxing only households whose yearly income exceeds the 
cost of the intervention. So, for instance, the cost of Jacob’s hemophilia 
treatment would be covered by a tax only on households who make $12 million 
or more per year. The rationale for the rescue tax is that: (1) only brute luck 
separates very wealthy individuals from being in the same position as Jacob, and 
(2) it would be rational for very wealthy individuals, unlike average-income or 
poor individuals, to pay high premiums to insure against the risk of needing very 
high-cost treatment. Although a rescue tax would face political challenges, there 
is real-world precedent for progressive taxation to fund health care: The ACA 
increased Medicare funding via taxes on high earners and on wealthy 
households’ investments.213  
One consequence of the rescue tax approach is that, in a poor or a highly 
equal society, very costly treatments would not be publicly subsidized. This 
outcome makes normative sense—a poor society should not be required to pay 
for very expensive medicines that would bankrupt the health care system.214 And 
we see in practice that more equal societies are less willing to pay unlimited 
prices for costly medicines.215  
 
 211 See Dworkin, Distribution of Health Care, supra note 72, at 888. 
 212 Cf. Emma Court, More and More Health Care Bills Are Over $1 Million—and Expensive Drugs Are 
Playing a Major Role, MARKETWATCH (July 22, 2018, 10:53 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
million-dollar-health-bills-have-spiked-and-expensive-drugs-are-playing-a-major-role-2018-07-16 (“What is 
the level of expense that we think is appropriate to pay for breakthrough drugs? . . . We will have to get to a 
point where we ask, ‘Is a $23 million drug something we want to pay for as a society?’”); Glabman, supra note 
36 (“If a single patient can increase health care costs for all and perhaps become a burden to society, what is the 
responsibility of the many to provide health care to the few? Whom should we keep alive? How much should 
we pay for it?”). 
 213 See Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113, 162–63 (2014). 
 214 Cf. Govind Persad, The Medical Cost Pandemic: Why Limiting Access to Cost-Effective Treatments 
Hurts the Global Poor, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 562 (2015). 
 215 See Margaret K. Kyle, Competition Law, Intellectual Property, and the Pharmaceutical Sector, 81 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 20 (2016). 
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C. Setting Boundaries 
As critics of reinsurance note and reinsurance proponents concede, 
reinsurance does not combat the high medical costs that necessitate its use.216 
Financing reinsurance progressively mitigates this concern but does not 
eliminate it. Even if treatment for expensive patients were entirely funded by 
taxes on the wealthy, these taxes would still have opportunity costs: The 
revenues raised could have been used to fund other important goals, such as 
ameliorating pollution and other upstream causes of ill health, and the taxes 
themselves create some degree of economic drag.217 Coupling reinsurance with 
efforts to limit costs is therefore attractive. This Section discusses three ways of 
limiting high costs: (1) discouraging the development of interventions that make 
patients costly to treat; (2) giving patients the option to opt out of costly 
treatments; and (3) requiring expensive patients to bear more of their own 
treatment costs. The first option is the most normatively justified and likely to 
be the most politically viable. 
1. Advance Discouragement of Expensive Treatments 
Jacob’s medical treatments are expensive because the drugs he takes are very 
costly. But drugmakers’ ability to charge these high prices is a result of a policy 
choice not to set limits on what society is willing to pay for treatment. Unlike 
most other countries, the United States neither regulates drug pricing nor 
considers costs at the stage of drug approval.218  
What would be a fair way of regulating prices for very expensive drugs? 
Some have suggested that society’s willingness to pay high amounts for rescue 
in individual situations indicates that it must attach a very high value to 
expensive drugs.219 This analysis overlooks the fact that time- and situationally 
 
 216 See, e.g., MENDELSOHN, supra note 138, at 3 (“Finally, reinsurance is an efficient mechanism for 
removing costly claims from rate setting, but it does not address the underlying healthcare costs that caused large 
bills in the first place.”); NORTH DAKOTA 1332 WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137; OKLAHOMA 1332 
WAIVER APPLICATION, supra note 137, at 120 (“Commenter had a concern that health care and health insurance 
are two separate issues. For example, health insurance has its own administrative complexity, which might 
potentially divert resources from needy people. Commenter would like the legislature to look at health care costs 
and ways to improve the health care system.”); id. at 122 (“Insurance carriers can’t reduce prices unless providers 
do. Where are they? Response: . . . We do acknowledge that we have to bend the health care cost curve.”); see 
also HALL, supra note 8, at 37. 
 217 See Kamin, supra note 197, at 271 (discussing inefficiency produced by taxation). 
 218 See Eric M. Katz, Europe’s Centralized New Drug Procedures: Is the United States Prepared to Keep 
Pace?, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 577, 585 (1993). 
 219 See Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs the Hardest 
Problem in Health Policy?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2273, 2282 & n.41 (2018). 
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inconsistent preferences (as discussed in Part II) make the value of a drug 
dependent on context. Society may rightly regard itself as ethically obligated to 
absorb very high costs to save someone once the means of saving them are close 
at hand, but not to absorb the same costs to ensure that the relevant means are 
close at hand.220 The socially justified cost to ensure the availability of expensive 
drugs may therefore be different from the socially justified cost of providing 
those drugs once they exist. This difference means that preventing the 
development of certain costly drugs can generate better outcomes by forestalling 
the existence of expensive societal obligations.  
Preventing the development and sale of expensive drugs could be achieved 
through a variety of precommitment strategies. One strategy would be to 
decrease incentives to produce treatments that are likely to be very expensive in 
comparison to the benefits they provide, because they help only a few patients 
or have only small benefits.221 Another would be to impose taxes or price 
regulations (potentially based on economic evaluations) on expensive 
treatments, which could encourage companies to channel resources into 
developing treatments that can be profitably sold at a lower cost.222 Yet another 
would be allowing insurers to exclude these treatments from coverage or 
formularies.223 Of these strategies, price caps and limits on research are likely to 
be most effective, because their preventive effect is furthest upstream and least 
likely to be criticized as denying rescue. Legally empowering insurers to refuse 
coverage would still expose them to public pressure to pay for expensive 
treatments.224 
 
 220 Cf. F. M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 371 (2007) (arguing that individuals may have an obligation to 
sacrifice their current possessions in order to rescue others, but no obligation to acquire possessions in order to 
rescue others). 
 221 See Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much Is Life Worth: Cetuximab, Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer, 
and the $440 Billion Question, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1044, 1045 (2009); Govind Persad, Should Research 
Ethics Encourage the Production of Cost-Effective Interventions?, in ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE OF BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH 13, 16 (Daniel Strech & Marcel Mertz eds., 2016). 
 222 The use of price regulation to incentivize lower-cost drug development would parallel the use of taxes 
on high-cost insurance plans to incentivize lower-cost care. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-
Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 919 (2011) 
(discussing how employers planned to respond to a tax on high-cost health plans by seeking to improve cost-
efficiency and manage care more closely). For an example of price regulation for pharmaceuticals, see Emma 
Cosh et al., Investing in New Medical Technologies: A Decision Framework, 13 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY 263, 
267 (2007) (arguing that “[i]f there is little or no chance that the technology could be marketed at a price” below 
the cost-effectiveness threshold, “then the technology should not attract further investment,” and devising a 
system for manufacturers to assess at an early stage whether to invest). 
 223 See Ed Silverman, CVS and the $100,000 QALY, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www. 
managedcaremag.com/archives/2018/12/cvs-and-100000-qaly. 
 224 E.g., id. (discussing critical responses to refusal of coverage for costly pharmaceuticals). 
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Price caps are likely to be a politically attractive solution because they could 
also garner support from current patients like Jacob. One commentator on 
Jacob’s case, for instance, recognizes that hemophilia drugs’ high prices reflect 
strategic decisions by pharmaceutical firms.225 Price caps would lower costs in 
the short term and thereby protect many patients from becoming expensive in 
the first place. We might still worry about a purported bad consequence of 
capping drug prices—reduced investment in research and development.226 But, 
where treatments are so expensive that they have little or no positive social 
value, the long-term reduction in investment in these treatments that price caps 
on pharmaceuticals would produce is in fact socially desirable.227 So is the 
incentive that such caps would generate to research and develop treatments 
whose cost would fall under the cap. It is not socially valuable for drug 
companies to invest in developing treatments that make patients tremendously 
expensive to treat.228 These investments, in fact, arguably do societal harm 
because they turn unpreventable tragedies into costly tragic choices.229 Although 
none of the state waiver or reinsurance proposals to date have incorporated price 
caps or other efforts to discourage the development of expensive treatments, 
coupling reinsurance with price regulation would help to fill the cost-control gap 
in current reinsurance efforts. 
Another way of discouraging the development of treatments that make 
patients expensive is to restructure subsidies for drug development. The Orphan 
Drug Act financially subsidizes the development of “orphan” drugs that will 
treat only a few patients.230 This subsidy is normatively difficult to justify. 
Patients with rare diseases are neither more nor less worthy of treatment than 
others, yet the Orphan Drug Act creates an incentive to prioritize saving fewer 
lives over saving more.231 It is misguided to incentivize the development of 
drugs that will help only a few patients at a time when research into new 
antibiotics, vaccines, and pain medications is urgently needed. Instead of 
 
 225 Westlund, supra note 17. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See Govind Persad, Pricing Drugs Fairly, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 228 Id. at 25. 
 229 Cf. Paul J. Zwier, High Prices in the U.S. for Life-Saving Drugs: Collective Bargaining Through Tort 
Law?, 17 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 203, 209 (2016) (arguing that pharmaceutical companies 
who charge excessive prices for lifesaving treatments commit the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress). 
 230 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); see Baker Norton Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., 132 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (describing the Orphan Drug Act).  
 231 See Niklas Juth, For the Sake of Justice: Should We Prioritize Rare Diseases?, 25 HEALTH CARE 
ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2017) (discussing arguments based on principles of need); Emily A. Largent & Steven D. 
Pearson, Which Orphans Will Find a Home? The Rule of Rescue in Resource Allocation for Rare Diseases, 
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 27, 29 (discussing ethical dilemmas presented by orphan drug funding). 
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subsidizing “orphan” drugs, governments would do better to offer prizes for 
drugs that address urgent and broadly harmful problems, such as antibiotic 
resistance, dementia, and obesity, or to increase scientific funding in these 
areas.232 
Changes to subsidies and drug prices might have meant that Mila’s and 
Jacob’s conditions were untreatable, rather than treatable at high cost. Fei 
describes her obstetrician telling her that “[t]wenty years ago, this would have 
been a miscarriage.”233 And a commentator on Jacob’s case asserts that 
“synthetic factor has been something like a miracle for the hemophilia 
community,” enabling longer life spans and better daily life.234 From a societal 
perspective, however, we can question whether these outcomes are “miracles,” 
or instead what Lewis Thomas calls “halfway technologies” that allow patients 
to stay alive at tremendous cost.235 It is difficult to say no to providing these 
technologies once they exist, but their cost means that we may be better off 
keeping them out of our own reach.236 
2. Opting Out of Treatment 
Yet another way of limiting costs posed by expensive patients is to allow 
patients to choose to decline expensive treatments in advance. One strategy for 
doing this, which Arti Rai calls “rationing through choice,” involves offering 
patients the option of committing in advance to refuse certain expensive 
treatments.237 Rationing through choice presents two difficult ethical issues, one 
involving distributive fairness and one involving the revocability of waiving 
one’s rights. The issue of distributive fairness is whether individuals who know 
they will not develop certain expensive conditions should be able to profit from 
this knowledge. Declining the option to receive expensive treatment for 
hemophilia presents a way for people who do not have hemophilia to avoid 
paying the cost of hemophilia treatment, regardless of whether they would have 
 
 232 See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 1019 (2012) (discussing “[p]rizes for vaccines or antibiotics”); Aaron S. 
Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 101, 150–51 (2011); W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 6, 49–50 
(2019). 
 233 FEI, supra note 19, at 6. 
 234 Westlund, supra note 17. 
 235 Lewis Thomas, Notes of a Biology-Watcher: The Technology of Medicine, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1366, 1367 (1971). 
 236 Id. at 1368. 
 237 Arti Kaur Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health 
Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1018 (1997); see also Persad, supra note 170, at 17. 
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selected expensive treatment if they had a chance of having hemophilia.238 This 
differs from the example of declining expensive treatment for late-life cancer, 
which will typically be purchased by people who are uncertain of their odds of 
developing cancer. Choosing such a plan can be understood as expressing a 
normative commitment to receiving more resources now in exchange for 
receiving fewer under certain specified circumstances later, rather than as 
profiting from one’s own better health. 
The waivability issue arises if someone opts out of access to a treatment, but 
then wants to opt back in once ill.239 Denying access to treatment, even based on 
an agreed-to past commitment, may be psychologically wrenching. Imagine, for 
instance, if Mila’s parents had opted out of access to expensive treatment before 
knowing they would have a very premature infant—we might want to give them 
the opportunity to reconsider, even though permitting such reconsideration 
vitiates the idea of a binding precommitment.240 People may also feel that they 
are better informed once they have become ill, although establishing whether the 
ill present or the healthy past should be the more privileged perspective for 
informed decision-making is difficult.241 
Another strategy for advance opt-out, which Christopher Robertson has 
called the “split benefit,” would allow ill patients to waive their right to 
expensive treatment in exchange for receiving a portion of the money that would 
otherwise have been spent on treating them.242 This approach avoids the problem 
of advantaging the healthy, since only ill patients will be offered this option. But 
the problem of waivability remains. Imagine that Jacob chooses (for instance) to 
receive a million dollars rather than a year of treatment. Once he is on death’s 
door, it will be difficult to enforce his bargain against him. The split benefit also 
has the problem of recurring eligibility: Opting to receive the split benefit rather 
 
 238 Rai discusses the problem of a choice-based system making it impossible to purchase insurance that 
will cover the problems of known expensive patients, but does not grapple with the problem of whether it is fair 
to profit from one’s own better health, as opposed to one’s health care preferences. See Rai, supra note 237, at 
1042–45. 
 239 Id. at 1038. 
 240 Although Rai recognizes this problem, she has difficulty addressing it: She suggests that “ex ante 
rationing choices that contemplated very serious and irreversible deprivations of liberty might be disallowed,” 
and that choices that bound individuals for more than a three- to five-year period would also be nonbinding. Id. 
at 1038–39. This exception would swallow the rule, because it would prohibit rationing that refuses lifesaving 
treatment, given that death is a serious and irreversible deprivation of liberty, and would also prohibit choices 
that have long-term serious health implications. 
 241 See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 776 (2007). 
 242 Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health Care Game, 
98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 945 (2013). 
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than an expensive treatment could lead someone to become even sicker and then 
to be eligible for a different expensive treatment. For the split benefit to avoid 
the problem of recurring eligibility, it would have to involve permanently 
waiving access to any treatment that arises out of a given condition, or waiving 
access to any treatment above a certain cost. 
3. Undue Hardship and Cost-Sharing 
If advance discouragement and opt-out fail, society faces the difficult 
question of when, if ever, expensive patients can be asked to pay for treatment 
out of pocket. This question is particularly difficult because out-of-pocket 
payment for expensive patients—unlike for cheaper treatments—is likely to 
mean de facto denial, or reliance on charity or crowdfunding.243  
The most compelling justification for setting boundaries on sharing involves 
the burdens that sharing imposes on others. One way of considering these 
burdens is the undue hardship framework used in disability accommodation 
law.244 Undue hardship doctrine establishes that a person with a disability is not 
entitled to an accommodation, even a very beneficial one, if the accommodation 
would impose an excessive burden on others. Importantly, assessing whether an 
accommodation imposes undue hardship involves considering the financial 
position of the actor who is being asked to absorb the accommodation’s cost: An 
accommodation may impose an undue hardship on a struggling employer, but 
not a wealthy firm.245 Or it may impose an undue hardship on other employees 
who are overwhelmed, even if it would be reasonable to ask employees with 
ample time to take up some of the slack.246 
An undue hardship framework would support bounding support for 
expensive patients at the point that funding this support imposes undue hardship 
on others. Such a framework would make boundedness dependent on breadth 
and progressivity. The broader or more progressive the cost-sharing structure is, 
the slower boundaries would be reached. Importantly, because undue hardship 
 
 243 See Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1920 n.207 (noting that few households can absorb very high costs). 
 244 See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002); see also Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency 
Rejected: Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1, 
2, 8 (1990); Jeffrey O. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable 
Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1432 
(1991). 
 245 See Crespi, supra note 244, at 14. 
 246 See, e.g., Kazmierski v. Bonafide Safe & Lock, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 838, 852 n.10 (E.D. Wis. 2016) 
(“Employers . . . may be able to show undue hardship where provision of a reasonable accommodation would 
be unduly disruptive to other employees’ ability to work.”). 
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analysis is distinct from a cost-benefit trade-off, sharing the cost of expensive 
patients’ care could be an undue hardship even if the costs that expensive 
patients impose are less than the total benefit they receive. The undue hardship 
framework is more analogous to the view that sacrifices can only be expected 
from others until those others must give up something of moral importance.247 
Once something of importance is at stake, individuals can legitimately be 
excused from further assistance even if the benefits of assistance, judged from a 
social perspective, outweigh its costs. 
Rather than asking expensive patients to pay the entire cost of treatments 
that impose an undue hardship out of pocket, expensive patients could instead 
be asked to assume a greater proportion of cost sharing. This departs from the 
typical justification for cost-sharing, which rests on the discouragement of moral 
hazard,248 by grounding cost sharing in a fairness, rather than an efficiency, 
justification. Although this type of cost-sharing is sometimes seen, as with 
brand-name drugs under value-based insurance, cost-sharing is ill-suited to 
setting limits on the sharing of expensive patients’ costs. This is because the 
treatments used by expensive patients are so costly that almost no household 
would be able to afford any significant amount of cost-sharing.249 
Ultimately, cost-sharing, like an advance opt-out, is difficult to implement 
in a context where expensive lifesaving technology exists.250 It is hard to hold 
individuals to a promise to die when (expensive) treatment is close at hand, or 
to deny individuals this treatment if they are unable to pay. This indicates that 
the upstream strategies discussed in Part III.A may be more effective at 
preventing patients from becoming expensive. By strictly regulating prices or 
refusing to approve or research expensive drugs, health policy can prevent tragic 
choices from arising—it can prevent the existence of costly treatment for 
unidentifiable expensive patients, rather than waiting for these patients to 
become identifiable and then denying them access to treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that fairly distributing the cost of expensive patients’ 
care requires considering three values: increasing the breadth of sharing, setting 
 
 247 Cf. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 241 (1972) (discussing the 
proposal “that we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something morally 
significant”). 
 248 See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 242, at 939. 
 249 Hoffman, supra note 46, at 1920 n.207. 
 250 See Robertson, supra note 242, at 941. 
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defensible boundaries on sharing, and increasing the progressivity of sharing. 
These values are most effectively operationalized by creating a reinsurance 
program to handle expensive patients’ costs; funding this program through a 
progressive tax that requires only wealthy individuals to pay for very expensive 
patients; and combining this tax-funded program with efforts to reduce the 
development and provision of treatments that would render patients very 
expensive. While this suite of policy prescriptions is the most likely to be 
effective and politically palatable, this Article has also discussed alternative 
ways of trying to increase breadth, set boundaries, and improve progressivity.  
As the next wave of healthcare reform proposals appear, recognizing the fact 
that so much of healthcare spending is directed toward expensive patients is 
crucial. Because so much medical spending is directed to expensive patients, 
limiting and fairly distributing the cost of their treatment will be an essential part 
of any successful healthcare reform that controls and fairly divides costs. This 
Article has provided a framework that can help enable health reform plans to 
achieve these goals.  
 
